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Abstract 
 
 
Group-based microfinance programmes, based on trust and solidarity among members, 
currently dominate development policy and practice as the approach compensates for 
individual poor’s lack of material resources and market imperfections. Despite strong 
evidence of its social and economic impact, few researches take an in-depth, empirical 
look at how the group models manifest and create social capital. Applying social capital 
theory, this paper seeks to contribute to a better understanding of the social capital 
building aspect of group-based microfinance by analyzing empirical data from a 
CEDAC supported village saving project in rural Cambodia. The study asserts that 
group-based microfinance scheme can indeed bring positive changes to social and 
gender relations beyond individual loans and savings. These changes are largely 
influenced by the type of social capital (norms, networks and trust) promoted by 
microfinance project’s social intermediation processes. The study reveals that group 
homogeneity and elite avoidance may not matter at all. The study further identifies that 
the social capital build up, especially where structural and institutional exclusion is 
addressed to harness all bonding, bridging and linking social capital, has the potential 
of enabling the poor and marginalized to participate and organize themselves in the 
community development and society transformation processes.  
 
Key words: social capital, microfinance, community saving, village saving, social 
network, social relations, community development, empowerment, collective 
action, Svay Rieng, Cambodia 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
1.1. Research Problem 
With eradicating poverty as the most daunting challenge today facing the global 
community, the impact of microfinance1 on Millennium Development Goals (MDG) 
has in the last decades caught the attention of development policy-makers and 
practitioners. There is strong evidence of positive microfinance impact on achieving the 
MDGs, especially in relation to income, education, health and women’s empowerment 
according to Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) website. Many non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have developed innovative programs to provide 
financial services to millions of poor people in the world2. Poor people rarely own 
assets to use as collateral to raise productive capital and, with subsistence-level 
production and survival consumption needs, they often find themselves in a vicious 
circle of poverty. To date, unfortunately, nearly three billion poor people in developing 
countries still lack access to the basic financial services needed to help them break this 
circle (CGAP 2007). In this context, microfinance, which provides small loans and 
other financial services to people living in poverty for self-employment and other 
income-generating projects, is seen as one of the most viable tools to alleviate poverty 
and foster socio-economic development for developing countries.  
 
Among innovative approaches, group-based credit and savings programs have 
multiplied rapidly because of their proven capacity to reach out to large numbers of 
poor. From Grameen Bank’s solidarity or self-help microfinance groups (SHMG) in 
Bangladesh, tontines3 in West Africa to FINCA’s4 village banking model in Latin 
America, group-based microfinance5 has become increasingly popular in development 
policy and practice. This group methodology taps into pre-existing social capital – one 
                                                
1
 The term microfinance has come to replace microcredit in the last decade as financial services 
broadened to include other products than just credit, such as savings and insurance. This paper uses 
microfinance and microcredit interchangeably.  
2
 There are about 5 million households being served by microcredit schemes worldwide (see Abbin et al 
2006) 
3
 Informal saving circles. 
4
 Foundation for International Community Assistance. 
5
 For details about the characteristics of various group-based organization models, please refer to 
Appendix 1.  
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of the few resources poor people have – which is transpired in personal relationships 
and networks, to enhance poor’s access to small, short-term loans. Social capital is 
regarded as substitutes for physical collateral to serve as guarantee for small loans. This 
collective liability lending systems depend on relationships among borrowers to 
transfer the responsibility of selecting borrowers, monitoring their loan use and 
enforcing repayment from lenders of microfinance institution organization (MFI or 
MFO) to groups (Stiglitz 1990; Varian 1990; van Bastelaer 1999; Karlan 2001; Besley 
and Guinnane 1994; Ghatak and Guinnane 1999). While income generation remains the 
focus of this approach, there is a growing belief among development institutions, such 
as the World Bank, and practitioners that group-based microfinance can also create 
social capital. They argue that the approach has the prospect of promoting group 
solidarity and trust among group members and form social horizontal and vertical 
networks of the SHMG members (Eghcom and Barton 1999; Szabo 1999; Kanak and 
Iiguni 2007). 
 
However, as Falk and Kilpatrick (1999) indicate, social capital as a concept itself is 
still evolving, much debated and critiqued. Viewed as the missing link in development 
(Grootaert 1997), social capital is often referred to as the norms and networks that 
facilitate collective action for mutual benefit. Portes (1998:7) argues that whereas 
economic capital is in people’s savings and human capital is in their heads, social 
capital inheres in the structure of their relationships. Social networks, whether 
horizontal or vertical, also operate along gender lines and they reflect the gendered 
nature of power relations between men and women (Bantilan and Padmaja 2008). 
Social capital has therefore multi-faceted dimensions (Dasgupta and Serageld 2001).  
 
 
Recent studies have noted the apparent capacity of group-based microfinance to 
empower the most vulnerable, especially women; its capacity to motivate the less 
economically active by enhancing their skills and access to valuable social and market 
information; and to establish community-based structures that build mutual support and 
trust which give promises for community-driven development. (Eghcom and Barton 
1999; Szabo 1999; Krishna and Uphoff 1999; Kanak and Iiguni 2007). The social 
interaction element is thus seen as central to group-based microfinance practice. Some 
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even equates this with the exchange of finance. Labeled social intermediation6 to 
reflect a parallel concept to financial intermediation, group-based approach that 
mediate financial and social services to participants is regarded an essential part of the 
microfinance process targeting the poor. By creating social capital that compensates for 
the poor’s lack of material assets and market imperfections, social intermediation 
promises to remove physical, economic, and social barriers for the poor (Eghcom and 
Barton 1999; Ito 2004). Social capital’s potential of becoming a strong force to enable 
economic processes for the world’s poor and disadvantaged cannot and should not be 
undermined. 
 
As with other development innovations, group-based microfinance models are not 
without critics. While some researchers have raised questions about the depth of 
outreach, the limits of repayment enforcement, and the intensity of empowerment 
effects, others have acknowledged both the administrative and time burdens placed on 
the poor and on the microfinance institutions as well (Eghcom and Barton 1999). 
Researches seeking answers to these questions have increased in recent years (van 
Bastelaer 1999; Karlan 2001; Mayoux 2000). As literature on social capital grows, 
more attention has also been turned to the social capital building aspects of 
microfinance.  
 
However, apart from the World Bank’s Sustainable Banking for the Poor project, there 
are significant research gaps in understanding the relationship between social capital 
and microfinance, especially in explaining how group-based microfinance creates 
social capital. Eghcom and Barton (1998) in their literature review of the social 
intermediation and microfinance programs note that a majority of the documentation 
focuses on institutional and financial sustainability, program operations and outreach. 
The discussion on social intermediation is only implicit if at all mentioned. Few 
researches take an in-depth, empirical look at crucial aspects such as how peer pressure 
functions; the nature of self-selection in groups; and the actual costs incurred (including 
subsidies) of building effective social organizations (ibid). Mayoux (2001) adds that 
many of the studies adopt a narrow understanding of social capital and ignore its 
                                                
6
 Social intermediation has been defined as a process in which investments are made in the development 
of both human resources and institutional capital, with the aim of increasing the self-reliance of 
marginalized groups, preparing them to engage in formal financial intermediation (Eghcomb and Barton 
1999). 
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downside. Portes (1998) and Woolcock (1998) point out that, just as human capital, 
different forms of social capital, can be used for purposes that hinder rather than 
enhance an individual’s welfare. For example, when group membership norms confer 
obligations to share rather than accumulate wealth, social networks can exclude new 
entrants, and communities with a lot of social capital, particularly if organized along 
ethnic or religious lines, can be harmful to each other and to society as a whole. Falk 
and Kilpatrick (1999) have identified externality as crucial for developing positive 
interactions to feed the common good. Grootaert et al (2005) also suggest that without 
proper control and accountability linking social capital can quickly become a 
mechanism for insider-trading and political favoritism.  
 
Attention thus needs to be paid to the sort of norms, networks and associations beyond 
horizontal networks that group-based microfinance initiatives are promoting or 
intermediating. (Mayoux 2005) Do they truly create positive social capital among the 
poor over and above those of an individual loan or saving? What are the characteristics 
of these interactive and intermediation processes that include or exclude the poorest and 
most disadvantaged? Can these processes live up to the development from below 
rhetoric that surrounds microfinance or are their importance overstated? These are 
serious questions calling for more in-depth empirical investigations, which have 
motivated this study.  
 
1.2. Purpose and research questions 
This study is a response to the call for more empirical research on how group-based 
microfinance schemes create social capital. It is also an attempt to give a voice to the 
poor and disadvantaged, especially women, to speak for themselves if and how 
intermediation processes of microfinance schemes steer collective actions towards 
poverty alleviation.  
 
Premised on this broad theoretical and contextual backdrop, this study seeks to explore 
how pre-existing social capital is manifested, to investigate the rationale, characteristics 
of and approaches to the social intermediation processes, as well as to examine their 
effects in achieving the wider social development goals microfinance promises. Using a 
qualitative case study in Cambodia, the study specifically attempts to tackle the 
following questions:  
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 Are there any changes to the social relations within and outside the group since 
the formation of the savings groups?  
 How are these changes caused by the social intermediation processes used by 
the group-based microfinance scheme? 
 What implications does this new social capital build-up have for the poor and 
disadvantaged to organize for wider community development7? 
 
Social capital theory entailed in both the financial and social paradigms of microfinance 
will set the analytical framework of the research, which in turn will guide the research 
design and data analysis for answering the research questions. While acknowledging 
the importance of macro- or institutional conditions on the creation of social capital, the 
study will focus on, though not be limited to, the micro- and meso-levels of social 
capital characterized by Grootaert and van Bastelaer (2001). Case study approach will 
set the primary methodological framework for this qualitative research. Through 
triangulating a combination of qualitative and participatory methods and techniques, 
the study have drawn on the experience of two savings group and their communities in 
a rural livelihood improvement project supported by CEDAC8. The field activities of 
the research were conducted between November and December 2008 in Svay Rieng 
and Kampong Cham provinces in Cambodia. The group in Svay Rieng, regarded by the 
livelihood project as successful, will serve as the critical case. The second group in 
Kampong Cham, established for a similar length of time yet regarded as poorely 
performed, will serve to supplement the analysis of the critical case by providing a 
richer context.  
 
The study will hopefully fill in the currently limited empirical research in Cambodia 
and elsewhere on how group-based microfinance creates social capital as well as to 
encourage dialogue between researchers, policymakers, practitioners and among the 
poor themselves to explore possibilities for self-sustained community development 
initiatives. 
 
                                                
7
 Wider community development is understood here as benefits made beyond individual household or 
group level. 
8
 Centre d’Etude et de Développement Agricole Cambodgien (Cambodian Center for Study and 
Development in Agriculture). 
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1.3. Disposition  
This chapter has so far introduced the research problem, defined the study purpose and 
questions and presented briefly the research methodology, theoretical framework and 
the cases. The organization of the rest of the paper will be as follows. Chapter 2 gives 
background information about Cambodia’s poverty, its microfinance sector and a brief 
account of its post-conflict social capital. Chapter 3 deals with theoretical framework, 
starting with past and present research on the topic, followed by an explanation of the 
analytical framework to be used for data collection and analysis. Chapter 4 discusses 
the methodology employed in the research, choices of methods, and data reliability and 
validity. Chapter 5 starts with an introduction to the cases, followed by analyses of the 
empirical data. Chapter 6 presents some concluding remarks, linking research findings 
with the broader research purpose.  
 
 
2. BACKGROUND ON CAMBODIA 
 
 
 
This chapter aims to provide a better understanding of Cambodia’s contextual setting in 
which the study was conducted. This begins with a brief account of Cambodia’s 
poverty profile and development challenges in Section 2.1 and continues with an 
overview of the microfinance sector in Section 2.2. Subsequently, section 2.3 discusses 
Cambodia’s social capital at the village level in the aftermath of Khmer Rouge’s 
systematic destruction of social relations and structures.  
 
2.1  Poverty  
Cambodians are relatively homogeneous people with approximately 90% of the 
population ethnic Khmer and 95% Buddhist (Central Intelligence Agency 2009)9. 
Despite remarkable progress on economic, social and political fronts since the end of 
decades of civil unrest, Cambodia remains one of the poorest countries in the world and 
                                                
9
 CIA World Factbook is the only reference available with this information. Figures on Cambodia’s 
ethnic make-up are somewhat difficult to determine as the latest population census of 1998 (2008 census 
results have not been released at the point of writing this thesis) did not address ethnicity issue, nor is this 
data available from the World Bank or UN agencies.  
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relies heavily on foreign aid10. Poverty in Cambodia is seen as attributed to high 
population growth, inadequate opportunities, lack of economic security, and exclusion 
among multiple sectors of the population (CSD 2002).  
 
Rural poor remain the most vulnerable. In 2006, of one third of the country’s 14 million 
people living below poverty line, 90% lived and worked in rural areas, largely on 
subsistence agriculture. (MoP and UNDP 2007) Although Cambodia is broadly self-
sufficient in rice in years of good harvest, this does not translate into food security at 
the household level. One in five Cambodians lived under the food poverty line (World 
Bank 2006:35). A typical poor household tends to have higher dependency burden, lack 
human capital (uneducated, unskilled and unhealthy), secure land tenure, and have 
limited access to irrigation facilities, roads, markets and basic services. They are 
particularly vulnerable to external and internal shocks, often forced to resort to distress 
sale of productive assets (including land) and/or enter long-term debt. A health shock is 
said to be more serious than a harvest failure. This vulnerability can often be explained 
by: (i) insufficient savings; (ii) underdeveloped financial markets for saving, borrowing 
or insurance; (iii) lack of livelihood diversification; (iv) reliance on common property 
resources for livelihood security, when access to or productivity of these resources is in 
decline; and (v) weak rule of law11 to guarantee justice in conflicts between the poor 
and wealthier or powerful actors. (ibid)  
 
Poverty in Cambodia also has gender dimensions. Decades of conflict and upheaval 
have resulted in 20% of households being female-headed – one of the world’s highest 
(CSD 2002). Although women perform 57% of agricultural labor, their access to 
natural resources, education, credit and extension services remain limited compared 
with their male counterparts (MOWA 2008). Rural women also carry a 
disproportionately high share of household work. Domestic violence haunts the lives of 
women and children. Contemporary attitudes and practices continue to reflect 
traditional unequal gender relations and power differences. Women’s representation in 
senior political and public decision-making positions remains low (ibid).  
 
                                                
10
 The country moved up eleven places to 129th out of 177 countries between the 1998 and 2007 UNDP 
Human Development Reports. 
11
 Cambodia ranks 166th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions 
Index for 2008 (Transparency International 2008).  
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In the above context, microfinance has been promoted in Cambodia as crucial in 
poverty reduction and rural development, especially for poor and marginalized women.  
 
2.2 Microfinance  
Microfinance has a relatively short history in Cambodia. Three decades of internal 
conflicts have ruined the country’s human resources base and financial infrastructure. 
The Khmer Rouge abolished money and banking during their reign and subsequently 
the Vietnamese instituted a centrally planned, mono-banking system which eventually 
failed. Since the Paris Peace Accords in 1992 and the establishment of UN 
peacekeeping operations, the number of international organizations has grown from just 
eight in 1980s to hundreds today. The focus was on relief to the most exposed and 
marginalized but challenges to all types of development were many, including 
microfinance. The financial system was underdeveloped with low public confidence 
and limited intermediation (Matthew 2005:1). No policy and legal framework for 
microfinance existed, and the communist-based frameworks of other related sectors 
were often incompatible with private enterprise and microfinance (MBP 2001).  
 
When the banking sector was privatized in 1990, farmers and small businesses lost their 
access to formal financial services and had to rely on informal money lenders. This, 
together with the international development trends, gave rise to hundreds of NGO-
supported microcredit projects and thousands of community-based financial institutions 
in rural Cambodia. While few of the latter are formally structured as cooperatives, 
many claim to apply similar values, such as democratic control, self-reliance, 
community-based development and an open, inclusive membership (Matthews 2005). 
According to Asia Resource Centre for Microfinance (ARCM), at the end of 2004, the 
microfinance industry was serving approximately 450,000 borrowers and 150,000 
depositors. 
 
Village banking methodology and the use of a self-help microfinance group (SHMG) is 
very popular among NGOs. Despite rapid growth of the sector, most demand for rural 
financial services continues to go unmet in Cambodia. There is general consensus that 
access to safe, liquid savings mechanism for rural households is even more poorly 
developed than credit services (Chandararot 2002).  
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As NGOs have been central to developing the sector, the government is stepping up 
efforts to define its role. The Royal Government of Cambodia’s (RGC) Rectangular 
Strategy for Growth, Employment, Equity and Efficiency has made a strong 
commitment to rural poverty reduction and enhance gender equality (MoP and UNDP 
2007). The government also recognizes microfinance as a vital mechanism to 
community development in all fields (RDB 2003) and prioritizes microfinance in the 
Financial Sector Development Plan of 2006-2015 to accelerate Cambodia’s 
development processes. 
 
The 1999 Financial Institution (banking) Law and increasing competition have resulted 
in fewer players in the sector, reorienting microfinance programs towards financial 
sustainability and increased reluctance to serve clienteles, especially rural folks, with 
greater operating costs. Given the existing limitations and unmet demand, new 
innovations are needed to reach out to rural settings, provide concurrent access to 
savings and credit, and deliver empowerment services currently lacking in most 
microfinance programs (Pact 2004)  
  
2.3 Social Capital  
Not surprisingly, most of the analyses of social capital in Cambodia account for the 
impact of decades of conflicts (Pellini and Ayres 2005:9). Bushra and Lopez (1994), 
for instance, document that years of disruption of communities and families during the 
Khmer Rouge regime have discouraged the spontaneous formation of local initiatives 
and groups for joint efforts to improve their status and living conditions. Trust is seen 
as the missing element in Cambodian society (UNICEF 1996). The following excerpt 
reflects the deep scars in the national psyche left by the experience: 
“In the Khmer Rouge’s time, trust was systematically destroyed. A friend 
would be asked to spy on a friend/…/Even today, people meet and recognize 
those who betrayed their loved ones. All the respected people in our village 
were singled out for betrayal” (Meas in Meas 1995:21)  
 
Even the official Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2003-2005 (CSD 2002:30) has 
accounted that social capital in Cambodian society was totally destroyed by the Khmer 
Rouge and the protracted civil conflict. The paper acknowledges that lack of social 
capital limits the poor’s opportunities to tackle poverty. 
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Colletta and Cullen (2000:11), while sharing similar assumptions, concluded in their 
empirical research in Cambodia that post-conflict social capital was not too different 
from those that existed before the wars. Informal networks along and beyond kinship 
lines continue to be organized. In addition, associations sponsored by the government, 
or initiated by village leaders and the pagoda have remained as they were before the 
conflict. The same was observed with the local associational activities such as rice 
banks, funeral associations, and water-users’ groups (ibid).  
 
Pellini and Ayres (2005) also argue that at different social hierarchical levels, bonding 
links between individuals exist. For example, parents come together to improve a 
school building. While the action reflects a shared objective and interest, the downside 
is the possible exclusion of the poorest members of the community, for instance, 
because of their financial inability to contribute or send their children to attend school. 
In addition, distance between rural areas and administrative centre has encouraged the 
development of indigenous coping systems, as self help initiatives and mutual savings 
groups. However, the mistrust produced by Khmer Rouge’s destruction to traditional 
institutions and values, such as family, religion and association, continue to make it 
difficult for different groups or associations to link with each other at the local level; 
individuals remain reluctant to overlap an asset to bridge differences between groups or 
to pool resources.  
 
According to Sedara (2001), the notion of patronage and the traditional hierarchical 
structure of the society have continued. Members of local associations are either village 
leaders or people with literacy skills and who are better off. This hierarchical structure 
has discouraged active participation of the population in village affairs, unless 
requested from above (Meas 1999). Patron-client relations persist to play a big part in 
shaping the way people or groups interact with each other in Cambodian society. This 
form of social capital is based on the expectation that there is a patron to whom one 
turns for help. The relationship carries with it mutual obligation which can work in 
positive and negative ways (Pellini and Ayres 2005). All this reaffirms the multi-
faceted and contextual nature of social capital, and maps complex social settings for the 
implementation and scaling-up of community-driven development initiatives. 
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3. THEORY 
 
 
 
This chapter comprises two parts. First, section 3.1 deals with research frontier which 
begins with a literature review of previous research to explore different concepts of 
microfinance and social capital, and their interface. The second part, section 3.2, 
illustrates the attempt to operationalize the conceptual and theoretical understanding of 
group-based microfinance and social capital, by modeling an analytical framework to 
explore the social capital building aspect of microfinance.  
 
3.1 Research Frontier 
The literature review in this section is selected based on the key concepts entailed in the 
three research questions related to the impact of group-based microfinance on social 
relations, the project’s intermediation processes and their outcome on poor’s 
organizational capacity. Previous theoretical and empirical research on these concepts 
will be discussed to explore the concepts, determine how the concepts will be used, 
measured and analyzed in this research.  
3.1.1. Social Capital: An Emerging Conceptual Framework? 
Evidently over the past few years, social capital has emerged as the preferred 
theoretical framework for understanding and alleviating poverty – and within which 
group-based microfinance for women has transpired as a favored development model 
(Fernando 2006:97). The concept of social capital, despite not being in its current term, 
existed ever since small communities were formed and humans interacted with 
expectation of reciprocation and trust (Platteau 1994; Woolcock 1998). The concept 
continues to be widely invoked by sociologists, political scientists and economists. 
Social capital is concerned with the connections among individuals (Putnam 2000: 19). 
The World Bank defines it as the institutions, relationships and norms that shape the 
quality and quantity of a society’s social interactions. It is not just the sum of the 
institutions which underpin a society – it is the glue that holds them together (Szabo 
1999).  
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Early attempts to define social capital focused on the degree to which social capital as a 
resource should be used for public good (Putnam 1993) or for individual’s benefit 
(Bourdieu 1986; Coleman 1988). Putnam (1993) was primarily concerned with the 
horizontal associations between people. These horizontal associations consist of social 
networks and associated norms that affect community productivity and well-being. 
Social capital facilitates coordination and cooperation at this level (Woolcock 1998; 
Narayan 1999; Krishna 2000). 
 
Coleman (1988) recognizes both vertical and horizontal associations between people 
but argues that horizontal ties are needed to give communities a sense of identity and 
common goal. Without bridging ties to transcend various social divides (e.g. religion, 
ethnicity, gender, socio-economic status), horizontal ties alone risk promoting narrow 
interests12, and restrict community’s access to information and material resources such 
as credit (Krishna 2000). The outcomes of social capital may not be all positive because 
it resides in the structure of relations and not in individual actors.  
 
North (1990) and Olsen (1982) broaden the concept to include the entire socio-political 
environment and the institutional framework of a society such as government, the 
political regime, the rule of law and civil entities. This view not only accounts for the 
importance of forging ties within and across communities, but recognizes that the 
capacity of various social groups to act in their interest depends crucially on the support 
(or lack thereof) that they receive from the state and the private sector (Pellini and 
Ayres 2005).  
 
Serageldin and Grootaert (2000:49), however, discount differences between these 
definitions, stating that they are largely artificial and unnecessary in operationalizing 
the concept for international development. They argue that what matters is the effect of 
social capital on development outcomes. Group-based microfinance schemes are their 
favourite example of illustrating positive development outcomes that social capital has 
brought. By tapping into the information that group members have about each other, 
explain Serageldin and Grootaert (2000), these schemes rely on social capital to 
overcome information deficiencies and the associated risks to prospective lenders. New 
                                                
12
 World Bank Social Capital Website http://go.worldbank.org/C0QTRW4QF0 
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microfinance initiatives are thus encouraged to employ similar institutional 
mechanisms to use pre-existing social capital or help create it.  
 
It is apparently not easy to examine the effects of something not clearly defined and 
theoretical conceptual debates are likely to continue for a long time (Szreter and 
Woolcock 2004). This study acknowledges that there is no single entity called social 
capital. However, for the purpose of the study, the following three connecting strands 
of social capital adapted from those developed by Woolcock (1998) will be used:  
 
 
In this context, Woolcock (1998) argues that poor people presumably have plenty of 
bonding social capital, some bridging social capital, but next to no linking social 
capital. It is widely believed among researchers and practitioners that by mobilizing 
pre-existing bonding social capital of the participants, bridging and linking social 
capital will gradually increase as participants become actively involved in microfinance 
activities. The following section will shed some lights into this argument.  
3.1.2. Social intermediation: does it matter?  
MFO, by their own definition and in their own rights, are mandated to provide financial 
services and to facilitate social interaction of their target population. The poor face 
different kinds of barrier to access productive capital. The basic notion or economics of 
microfinance is simple: if poor people are given access to financial services, including 
credit, they may very well be able to pursue self-employment or income-generating 
Table 1. Definitions of bonding, bridging and linking social capital 
 
Bonding social capital 
(close horizontal 
networks) 
Strong ties among members of families and ethnic groups, close friends 
and associates sharing similar demographic characteristics. 
Bridging social capital 
(extended horizontal 
networks) 
Weaker ties between people from different ethnic, geographical and 
occupational background but with similar economic status and political 
influence. 
Linking social capital 
(vertical networks) 
Ties between poor people and those in the position of influence in 
formal institutions such as banks, agricultural extension officers, 
schools, local authorities, etc). Linking social capital is related to the 
capacity of individuals and communities to leverage resources, ideas, 
and information from formal institutions beyond the immediate 
community radius. 
 
Adapted from Woolcock (1998) 
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activities that will allow them to break the vicious circle. Financial services are usually 
catered for marginalized target groups (women, poor, rural, landless, deprived, etc). 
Decades of microfinance experience have shown that financial intermediation alone is 
not enough to ensure meaningful participation and development outcome. Group-based 
models have evolved as the favored microfinance innovation because of their proven 
outreach capacity to large numbers of poor. They achieve this by tapping into social 
capital, bonding social particular in particular, and create mechanisms to bridge the 
gaps created by poverty, illiteracy, gender inequality and remoteness. Researchers and 
policymakers generally recognize that by creating social capital that compensates for 
the poor’s lack of material assets and market imperfections, social intermediation 
promises to remove physical, economic and social barriers for the poor (Eghcom and 
Barton 1999; Ito 2004).  
 
However, as previously mentioned, a majority of the microfinance literature focuses on 
institutional and financial sustainability, program operations and outreach. Social 
intermediation is only implicitly discussed and in-depth, empirical research are lacking 
especially with regards to how peer pressure functions; the nature of self-selection in 
groups; and the actual costs incurred (including subsidies) of building effective social 
organizations (Eghcomb and Barton 1999). Studies on community organizations have 
often shown an association between social capital and sustainability of these 
organizations, though the studies are limited to the bonding level (Garforth and Munro 
1995) while bridging and linking social capital as well as the causality between social 
capital and organizational sustainability are often not in focus. 
 
Within the existing microfinance literature on the concept of social intermediation, 
Bennett and her colleagues in the World Bank’s Sustainable Banking with the Poor 
project possibly have made the most extensive conceptualization of social 
intermediation. They define social intermediation as a process in which human 
resources and institutional capital of the marginalized are developed to increase their 
self-reliance and access effectively and productively the financial services of the formal 
sector. The process thus entails attempts to create systems and products for people who 
do not normally interact with formal institutions or even with each other due to 
illiteracy, lack of assets, gender or ethnic background. The process also seeks to create 
new systems and institutions to change self-perceptions, build self-reliance and 
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confidence, and enhance empowerment and social cohesion (Bennett et al 1994; 
Bennett 1996) 
 
Built largely on Bennet’s work and other researchers, Eghcomb and Barton (1999) 
summarize social intermediation as a process which involves the building of bonding 
and or bridging social capital in the form of groups that can generate an information 
asset for their members, allowing peer lending and borrowing relationship. The process 
also transforms beneficiaries into clients by developing and enforcing contracts 
between lender and borrower, and by supporting the poorest to gain ownership and 
control over resources. This component of social intermediation leads to the 
establishment of systems and structures in which one or more institutional players 
create a sustainable process that links poor borrowers to sources of capital and financial 
services, both credit and savings, presumably creating linking social capital (ibid).  
 
Indeed, among the limited empirical studies, Kanak and Iiguni (2007) conclude from 
their study of a group-based microfinance program of BRAC13 in rural Bangladesh that 
a microfinance program does not necessarily create effective social capital unless 
enforced by the MFO. They argue that social capital formation depends largely on well-
designed social intermediation strategy and its actual implementation at the community 
level. In short, social capital is not a natural outcome of microfinance.  
 
According to Eghcomb and Barton (1999), much of its social intermediation outcome 
(positive or negative) depends on the vision of the program’s social intermediation, the 
way it operates, how it promotes these groups and establishes and enforces ground 
rules. And this can be largely explained and steered by the choice and balance of 
microfinance schemes along their financial and social justifications. This is where 
Mayoux’s (2000) three well known and inter-related microfinance paradigms come into 
play in many microfinance analyses and debates. The following section will discuss the 
impact of these paradigms on social intermediation processes and their causal relations 
between these processes and wider social impact, specially relating to the formation of 
social capital widely assumed by group-based microfinance programs.  
 
                                                
13
 Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee, an international non-government organization based in 
Bangladesh. 
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3.1.3. Wider social impact: inclusive or exclusive? 
As above highlighted, most microfinance schemes have emerged to compensate for a 
particular form of institutional exclusion - a social understanding of poverty, such as 
the exclusion of the poorer sections of a population from formal financial institutions, 
and among the very poor from informal financial markets as well (Kabeer and Murthy 
1996). The causes of this exclusion and hence the models of financial and social 
intermediation service delivery vary considerably. 
 
Mayoux’s (2000) three inter-related paradigms are broadly used to underpin the 
financial and social intermediation justifications of microfinance programs. These are 
Financial Self-Sustainability, Poverty Alleviation, and Empowerment14 (see Table 2). 
Within Financial Self-Sustainability paradigm, participation of marginalized people in 
groups is promoted as a crucial means of strengthening financial sustainability and 
poverty targeting through drawing on social capital for collective activities (Mayoux 
2001). This paradigm plays a big part in the intermediation approaches of MFOs. The 
Poverty Alleviation paradigm aims for communitarian self-organized development, 
which is central to the potential of group-based microfinance on poor’s capacity to 
organize themselves and exercise their agency individually and collectively. The 
Empowerment paradigm argues that women or disadvantaged people need to organize 
themselves in order to escape their double oppression, in the patriarchal gender order 
and within the working class (Mayoux 1998, 2000)  
 
Mobilizing pre-existing social capit al through group-based microfinance is assumed to 
have the ability to impact social as well as gender relations. Gender relations refer 
essentially to the power relations between men and women. They form part of the 
broader understanding of social relations which is the subject of primary concern to this 
research.  
                                                
14
 Empowerment has been much debated and analyzed as a concept itself. Mayoux’s original definition 
of Empowerment entails specifically a feminist perspective. For the purpose of more focused 
discussions, empowerment is understood here as agency (the ability to define one’s goals and act upon 
them), awareness of gendered power structures, self-esteem and self-confidence (Kabeer 2001). 
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Mayoux (1998) argues that group-based programs are assumed to build or reproduce 
social capital through developing economic and social networks of marginalized 
people. This is then assumed to further empower the marginalized through enhancing 
their ability to increase incomes, negotiate change in the household and participate in 
collective social and political activities (Sebstad et al 1995). Social capital is thus 
viewed as automatically contributing to financial sustainability, poverty targeting and 
empowerment (Mayoux 2005). Hulme and Mosley (1996) support the view that the 
Financial Self-Sustainability and Poverty Alleviation paradigms can be generally 
conflated as increased economic activity of the poor evidently contributes to increased 
community well-being. One could also include empowerment paradigm in the 
conflation by arguing that the economic success of SHMG not only increased 
members’ participation in community development but also transforms their relations 
in their community and households (Edward and Olsen 2006).  
 
Recent research, however, has questioned the extent to which reliance on pre-existing 
social capital necessarily enhances financial self-sustainability, empowerment and 
poverty targeting – here can be understood as proxy indicators of wider social impact. 
 
Table 2: Three Schools of Thought About Micro-Finance 
 
 
Financial  
Sustainability 
Poverty  
Alleviation Empowerment 
Underlying 
development 
paradigm (Thomas 
et al 2001) 
Neo-liberal market growth Poverty alleviation and 
community development 
(Feminist) critique of 
capitalism 
Target group Entrepreneurial poor Poorest of the poor 
Typically poor women 
(but here expanded to 
include marginalized 
people) 
Reason for 
targeting 
Efficiency, high female 
repayment rate, increasing 
economic activity of 
women  
High levels of female 
poverty, women’s 
responsibility for household 
well-being 
Equality, human rights 
and social justice  
Definition of 
empowerment 
Economic, expansion of 
individual choice and 
capacity for self-reliance 
Community development, 
well-being and self-
sufficiency 
Transformation of power 
relations in society 
Role of 
participation 
Consultation and group 
formation to decrease 
costs of service delivery 
and increase commitment 
and innovation 
Development of self-owned 
and self-managed peoples’ 
organizations for 
community development 
Empowerment to 
articulate their collective 
interests and organize 
for change in social (and 
gender) relations 
 
Adapted from Box 1. Edward and Olsen 2006 
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The financial imperatives for sustainability often lead microfinance programs to only 
engage the collective in reducing administrative costs and motivating repayment, at the 
expense of the more time-consuming processes of consciousness-raising and 
empowerment (Rankin 2001). Some research shows that women, for example, are only 
used as unpaid debt collectors mediating between development agencies and male 
family members, increasing their dependency on men and/or conflicts between women 
to fulfill repayment targets (Goetz and Sen Gupta 1996; Rahman 1999; Mayoux 2001). 
Others concern about the pressures on groups to exclude the poorest (Hulme and 
Mosley 1996; Montgomery 1996), challenging the Poverty Alleviation paradigm and 
risking to increase inequalities within communities and within groups. Indeed, previous 
development experience revealed unintended outcome of elite capture or elite control 
over community-driven development (CDD)15. Mostly as a result of skipping the 
empowerment phase, power relations in rural communities were subjected to abuse by 
better-educated and well-connected elites through promoting perverse mechanism of 
peer-selection and election of leadership (Esman and Uphoff 1984; Agrawal 1999). 
Interestingly in the literature of recent years, the concern of elite capture or control 
over CDD has taken a different perspective. For example, in analyzing a CDD project 
in Indonesia, Dasgupta and Beard (2007) discovered that in cases where the project was 
controlled by elites, benefits continued to be delivered to the poor, and where power 
was the most evenly distributed, resource allocation to the poor was restricted. This 
empirical evidence has challenged the discourse on the importance of homogeneity in 
implementing SHMG models and the possible counter-productiveness of excluding or 
avoiding local elites or better off community members in participatory development 
initiatives. The opportunity to strengthen bridging and linking social capital for 
achieving wider development project deliverables could be missed. As Brinkerhoff and 
Goldsmith (2000) suggest, participatory processes may also result in policy stalemates 
and unrealistic expectations on the part of those involved. 
 
Mayoux’s (2001:458) empirical study of microfinance programs in Cameroon revealed 
that the assumption underlying the financial paradigm that social capital can be used by 
programs without external intervention to build or increase it reflects a narrow 
understanding of social capital. This understanding focuses mainly on the bonding and 
                                                
15
 The World Bank and international donor agencies use this term mostly as an approach to development 
that supports participatory decision making, local capacity building, and community control of resources. 
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bridging social capital, and ignores the vertical linkages, unequal power relations and 
the macro-level environment. In this case, reliance on pre-existing social capital as a 
mechanism for reducing program costs may undermine program aims not only of 
empowerment but also of financial sustainability and poverty targeting. Mayoux argues 
that existing microfinance literature rarely discuss how different types of social capital 
can operate to the disbenefit of disadvantaged and marginalized, especially women 
(ibid). Edward and Olsen (2006) added that the complementarity of interests of 
individual, community and the marginalized people should not be oversimplified and 
automatically assumed. In order for social capital to build up for more sustainable 
social changes and wider communitarian development purposes, Mayoux (2001) argues 
that microfinance schemes need to address the sophistication of inequalities in 
resources, power and rights between different segments of the society and between 
women and men at all levels.  
 
3.2 Analytical framework 
Despite ongoing debate about the definition and how it should be measured, social 
capital or its characteristics seem to surface for any researchers exploring what 
attributes to the success or failure of microfinance programs (Szabo 1999; Ito 2003), as 
well as for development agencies such as the World Bank seeking viable solutions 
through participatory grass-roots development approaches. While letting debates about 
the concept of social capital continue elsewhere, for the purpose of discussion, this 
thesis adopts the working definition of social capital as the norms and networks that 
enable collective action (Woolcock and Narayan 2000: 226). The literature review has 
so far supported the notion that there is a relationship between group-based 
microfinance schemes and social capital. It has also affirmed the important role 
externality or social intermediation processes play in the success or failure in social 
capital formation.  
 
This study aims to build on the broader understanding of social capital to fill in the gap 
of empirical studies in explaining how group-based microfinance schemes manipulate 
and create social capital; and how the sort of norms, networks and associations 
promoted can influence individuals, especially poor and marginalized, in mobilizing 
themselves for collective action and broader community development.  
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An analytical model (see Figure 1) will be used for the discussion of the empirical data 
from the case study. The model builds around the concepts of bonding, bridging and 
linking social capital and the associated dimensions of networks, trust and norms used 
by the World Bank. Through studying a successful case from a group-based 
microfinance model, the research will first seek evidence of social capital build up 
since the formation of the savings group (research question one). Based on this 
evidence, the research will examine the social intermediation processes and identify the 
causal relationship between these processes and the social capital formation (research 
question two). Lastly, the study will explore what implications this social capital build-
up and the associated social intermediation processes realistically have on the capacity 
of the poor and marginalized to organize themselves for wider community-driven 
development (research question three).  
 
The analytical model will be used to ensure theoretical consistency across both the 
what and the how dimension currently lacking in existing social capital literature (Falk 
and Kilpatrick 1999). The intersection of what theory with how theory offers a means 
of triangulating the conceptual, theoretical and analytic integrity (ibid). This approach 
to theoretical consistency has to a large degree informed the choice of a combination of 
research methods in this case study.  
 
Figure 1. Analytical Model for the Case Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
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4. METHODOLOGY  
 
 
 
The chapter first presents the case study’s methodological point of departure, typology 
and nature of the research in Section 4.1. A discussion of the methods employed in the 
data collection follows in Section 4.2. The chapter ends with an account of the different 
measures purposely taken to safeguard the reliability and validity of the data collected.  
 
4.1 Meta-Science Position, Typology and Nature of Research 
This research takes on some form of critical theory (Mikkelsen 2005:136) which 
bridges interpretivism and critical realism (Bryman 2001:502-504) as the study is 
particularly interested in social capital and how it is manifested and reproduced by the 
group members for improving their living conditions and to identify power structures 
within and outside the group in order to counteract inequalities and injustices. The 
research design has thus both deductive and inductive aims. This point of departure has 
directed the research strategy, research focus and approaches to data collection and 
analysis (Bryman 2004).  
 
Qualitative methods are chosen since they are less time-consuming, best understood as 
data enhancer (Ragin 1994), and can provide better understanding of complex realities 
and processes for micro-level case studies, giving a voice to society’s most vulnerable 
and marginalized (Mayoux in Desai and Potter 2006:116-117; Bryman 2004).  
 
Measuring social capital is not an easy task as the concept is often vested in entities as 
trust, community, peer pressure, role models, networks and other social interactions 
involving subjective processes (Quibria 2003). It is therefore only natural that social 
capital studies rely on qualitative approaches. This view is confirmed by experience 
from recent research on social capital (Dudwick et al 2006:iv) which point to 
qualitative and participatory methods as the preferred approach to understand the 
causes and nuances of relationships and the contexts within which they exist.  
 
As the study aims to unfold contextual conditions pertinent to the use of social capital 
as a development instrument, case study sets the primary methodological framework 
for this qualitative research. Creswell (2007:245) explains that, case study, 
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characterized as in-depth data collection from multiple sources of information, focuses 
on one issue and provides insight into that issue.  
 
4.2 Methods 
Participatory methods and techniques within qualitative approach were used to collect 
data from multiple dimensions of social capital and power structures at individual, 
household and community levels. Data was collected between November and 
December 2008 in two villages, one in Svay Rieng province and the other in Kampong 
Cham province using semi-structured interviews, observation, group discussions and 
documents review. A total of 32 semi-structured interviews and three group discussions 
were conducted with project staff, members and non-members in the two villages. For 
the purpose of confidentiality, pseudonyms are given to the villages, the savings groups 
and individual interviewees. (See Appendix II for a complete list of interviews and 
group discussions). The interviewees from the Rieng Village will be distinguished with 
an R and from Champ Village with a C. Also an M for group member and H for the 
husband or household member.  
4.2.1. Interviews 
Semi-structured interview is chosen because the method encourages respondents to 
elaborate on their own experiences and allows insights to how different stakeholders of 
group-based microfinance perceive each other and how they see it impact their living 
conditions (Kvale 1996:104). Seven key informant interviews were conducted with 
practitioners from organizations implementing various group-based microfinance 
models. The interviews were useful in two ways: in testing the perceptions from 
preliminary literature review of group-based microfinance and in gaining broader and 
deeper insights to social and economic impact of group-based microfinance in rural 
areas and in a post-conflict context. The interviews followed an interview guide (see 
Appendix III) based on the key concepts drawn out of the research questions.  
  
The second round of interviews was conducted in the communities of the two savings 
groups. Twenty six semi-structured interviews were conducted with 12 group members, 
4 family members, 10 non-members) individually to address the sensitivity entailed in 
the social and gender relational dimensions of the research topic.  
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4.2.2. Observation 
Observation during a study provides valuable information on persistence and change 
(Mikkelsen, 2005:88). Non-participant observation16 was used through staying for a 
short period with the group leader, walking around the village and attending CEDAC’s 
training and women networking activities at the field level. Behaviors, norms and 
values of the villagers and project officers were observed. The method allowed 
recording and analyzing everyday situation of individuals, the group and the institution 
in a natural setting (Dewalt 2002:2) and through their own voice and action (Ragin 
1994:44). This provided valuable information on the dynamics of intra- and extra-group 
relations and CEDAC’s institutional messages and services.  
4.2.3. Group Discussion 
Group discussion method was used considering that women in rural Asia are not used 
to being asked their opinions from outsiders (Desai and Potter 2006:45). Group 
discussions can provide retrospective introspection to reflect: 1) on group views, beliefs 
and reasons for collective action, 2) on sensitive topics, 3) clarification of a range of 
perceptions and opinions found in the group, 4) from people with low literacy 
(ibid:155). A formal group discussion was conducted with each of the two savings 
groups following their monthly meeting with a focus on their perceptions of the social 
and gender changes since they joined the savings group and how they see the social 
intermediation processes of the microfinance scheme as well as their capacity to 
address common community problems (Mikkelsen 2007:59). An informal group 
discussion was held with community members in the village of the critical case as they 
gathered around research activities.  
4.2.4. Documents Review 
Microfinance and social intermediation strategies of CEDAC were reviewed as 
documented in their project reports and documents and compared those to actual 
implementation approaches on the ground. Savings and borrowing records of group 
members were also reviewed to triangulate findings of the in-depth interviews and 
group discussions.  
                                                
16
 Non-participant, or direct, observation is where data are collected by the researcher without taking an 
active part in the situation under scrutiny. (Marshall 1998) 
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4.3 Selection of the Cases 
The unit of analysis in this research is savings group. As case study approach focuses 
on the context of both the case and unit of analysis (Yin 2003:24), identifying one or 
two suitable savings group, representative of the Cambodian context and a group-based 
microfinance model as well as relevant to the research questions, were prioritized from 
the onset. Performance ranking (groups with relative different performance) and wealth 
ranking (groups with relative different income or social indicators) were used to 
identify groups with MFI. Ideally, the savings groups should be in rural areas with 
socio-economically diverse settings within and outside the group, established for 5-10 
years, and supported by an NGO with poor targeting objective. Five savings groups17 
were identified through several NGOs and visited during their monthly meetings in 
three different provinces.  
 
The initial selection criteria were proven a challenge. First, most of the NGO’s 
microfinance projects centered Khmer-dominated areas and they were only slowly 
emerging in ethnic minority areas (Informant 2, 4). Secondly, most of the groups were 
established for less than five years. With the selection criteria adjusted to these realities, 
two savings groups supported by CEDAC were selected for the case study to show 
different perspective of the same issue (Creswell 2007:62). They are in two of the 
country’s poorest and most populated provinces - Svay Rieng and Kampong Cham (see 
Figure 2 for the map of the research sites). Both the groups have been established since 
2004. The Rieng group in Svay Rieng, which will be the critical case of the research, 
was characterized by CEDAC staff as successful whereas the Cham Group in Kampong 
Cham, considered poorly performed, will be used to complement the analysis. 
                                                
17
 Supported by three different NGOs (Pact, CEDAC and Farmers Credit Union)  
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Stratified or purposive sampling was used to ensure interviews include diverse 
characteristics (age, education, gender, economic and marital status) of group members, 
family members and community members to allow different perspectives for the 
research question and to avoid reaching prematurely saturation point (Ragin 1994:84-
85). The sampling was supported by a social mapping (Mikkelsen 2005:194) developed 
with the village chief.  
 
4.4 Reliability and Validity  
A number of measures have been taken to attain the quality standards of reliability and 
validity (Kvale 1996). These included expert opinion to confirm the validity of the 
research topic, justified methodological choices, and a combination of qualitative 
methods and sources to triangulate data collected. Stratified sampling of individual 
interviewees from different segments of the group and community members was used 
to take account of representative and diverse perspectives. This sampling method can 
also prevents premature saturation of information. The translator was well briefed to 
ensure the full account of what was said by respondents. Moreover, pre-translated 
interview questions into Khmer, audio-recording of formal interviews and end-day 
Figure 2. Provincial Map of Cambodia indicating the research sites 
 
 
Source: http://www.canbypublications.com/maps/simpleprov.htm 
Cham Group 
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Rieng Group 
(critical case) 
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discussion with the interpreter of field notes allowed cross-referencing for accuracy. 
(Desai and Potter 2006:ch18). 
 
 
The methodological discussions in this chapter can be summarized by the following 
table (Table 3). The table illustrates how different methods have been selected and 
employed to explore the three research questions within the analytical framework 
presented in Figure 1.  
 
 
5. CASE STUDY  
 
 
This chapter is divided into two parts. Section 5.1 gives a general description of 
CEDAC’s Saving for Self-Reliance Project and the two selected cases. Section 5.2 
presents the findings and analyses of the collected empirical data.  
 
5.1 General Description of the Project and the Cases  
5.1.1. CEDAC Saving for Self-Reliance Project  
CEDAC was set up in August 1997 as a national NGO, to promote family-based 
ecological agriculture and participatory rural development in Cambodia as the country 
Table 3. Overview of the employment of Research Methods 
Research questions Focus Sources Methods 
1. How have social relations 
within and outside the group 
changed since the formation of 
the savings group? 
Bonding, 
bridging and 
linking social 
capital: before 
and after MF 
Project staff 
Group leadership & members 
Non-members 
Husbands/family members 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Observation 
Group discussions 
Documents review 
2. How does the project’s social 
intermediation processes result in 
these changes?  
MF paradigms: 
the sort of 
norms, 
networks and 
trust pursued  
Project staff 
Group leadership & members 
Non-members 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Observation 
Group discussions  
Documents review 
3. What implications do the 
outcomes of these social 
intermediation processes have for 
the capacity of the poor and 
disadvantaged to organize for 
wider community development? 
Outlook: 
fostering social 
capital for 
development 
from below  
Project staff 
Group leadership & members 
Non-members 
Key informant interviews 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
Observation 
Group discussions  
Documents review 
 
 
Source: Author 
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moved towards national reconstruction. Originally, CEDAC’s development activities 
focused on improving the living conditions of small farmers through the development 
and dissemination of technical innovations in ecological agriculture. However, CEDAC 
realized that technical innovations alone were not enough and that farmers could 
benefit from accessing financial services, such as savings and credit, to help them 
diversify their livelihood activities. Hence, they started organizing their farmers’ groups 
into savings groups. (CEDAC 2007) In April 2005, CEDAC was interested in 
improving its work with savings groups by adopting Oxfam America’s training 
curriculum and accessing their technical support. Before that, CEDAC was already 
working with approximately 700 savings groups with 9,500 members. A new 
methodology not wholly consistent with the initial savings group principles was 
promoted to form new groups and to retain existing ones. The new approach, under the 
project called Saving for Self Reliance (SfR) Project18, focused on: a simplified and 
transparent record keeping system; a participatory approach to building group rules; 
and a clearly delineated set of roles and responsibilities for members and management 
committee (Parmeshwar and Koma 2009) Further facts and figures of the project can be 
found in Appendix IV. 
 
5.1.2. The two cases  
The Rieng Group, which forms the basis of the case study here, was formed in 2004 in 
a village called Rieng in Svay Rieng province which borders Vietnam in southeastern 
part of the country. The village is about 122 to 187 km away from the capital city of 
Phnom Penh. A total of 155 households (nearly 600 people) live in mud-and-thatch 
houses spread across three divisions of the village. The village is representative of 
many farming villages in the country. As in most part of Cambodia, the village is 
connected to the administrative structure of the province through the village chief who 
was politically appointed and has been in his role since 1979 (Davenport et al 1995). 
The provincial town is about 40 km away. Government services in the village are 
limited except for a health centre and two primary schools. Majority of the households 
are impoverished small-land holders. Short-duration rice crops are grown for both 
subsistence and market. But rice diseases are common, resulting in food deficits in past 
years. About 30% of the households are landless and have no livestock. An average 
                                                
18
 Oxfam America calls the project Saving for Change in Cambodia.  
Rethinking Social Capital in Development: Can Group-Based Microfinance reproduce Social Capital?  
A Case Study in Rural Cambodia 
33/63 
adult villager has completed primary schooling. As part of livelihood strategies 
between the planting and harvest seasons, villagers may seek wage work from other 
farmers while others work in garment factories (mostly women) near the town. The 
better-connected would seek work at construction sites or run small businesses in 
Phnom Penh (Informant 6, 8R; observation). A typical seasonal calendar and critical 
events of the village is illustrated in Figure 3: 
 
 
Only a fraction of the households have electricity or sanitation facilities. Villagers 
collect dry wood for cooking and use water from communal wells or hand pumps built 
by local NGOs for drinking, cooking and washing. Road access into and out of the 
village often becomes difficult during the rainy season. Mobile village vendors provide 
villagers with vegetables and other basic supplies from town. As in other villages in 
Cambodia, Rieng Village was devastated socially and economically during the Khmer 
Regime. Villagers were forced out of the village to cultivate farmlands in other parts of 
the country. Following the fall of the regime, those who survived have returned to the 
village and started rebuilding their houses, farms and livelihoods (Informant 8R, 
12RM; observation). 
 
The Rieng Group was established in 2004 following a village meeting organized by 
CEDAC introducing the concept of community savings group and encouraging women 
in the village to form a savings group. The group has 12 women members (between the 
age of 23 and 51) with one moved out of the village. The members of Rieng Group are 
rather homogenous: born in the village, farmers, poor and mostly uneducated except for 
those in leadership roles (Informant 9RM; group record). 
 
Figure 3. Seasonal calendar and major events in Rieng Village 
 
         school starts   
   New year      Pchum Ben   
   Buddhist ceremony 
Water 
festival 
 
wedding season    wedding season 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
   rainy season harvest 
       Planting/transplanting more health issues  
        out-migration return 
      Increasing household financial stress  
Note: Pchum Ben is a Cambodian festival to pay tribute to ancestors and family members who have passed away. 
 
Source: Author  
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The complementary case, Cham Group in Kampong Cham province, was established in 
February 2004. The group and the village share many similar socio-economic 
characteristics to those of Rieng Group. However, the Cham village is generally poorer. 
Few households have land, vehicles, access to clean water and none has access to 
electricity. The group currently consists of 6 members including one man. Four 
members have dropped out. Although some members have had some form of education 
previously, the group leader is the only one in the group who can read and write. 
(Informant 7, 24C, 25CM; group record; observation)  
 
Both groups hold monthly meetings during which members contribute their savings, 
request for loans and discuss other common issues. During the first year of group 
formation, the groups received support from CEDAC project staff in terms of capacity 
building with regards to group organization and management (Informant 6, 7). Table 4 
below illustrates the basic facts and figures of the two groups. 
 
5.2 Changes to social relations 
This section aims to answer the first research question: How have social (and gender) 
relations within and outside the group changed since the formation of the savings 
groups?  
 
The interviews with the respondents, discussions and observations in the village of 
Rieng Group have shown that despite the socio-economic drawback, there existed 
informal norms, networks and other social interactions in the village even well before 
the formation of the Rieng Group. There was strong bonding and bridging social 
Table 4. Basic facts and figures about the two cases 
 Rieng Group Cham Group 
Province Svay Rieng Kampong Cham 
Year Established Nov 2004 Feb 2004 
No of members 12 (all female) 6 (5 female and 1 male) 
Age range 23-66 20-44 
Living conditions# Low – High Low-Medium 
Education 3 literate 1 literate 
Savings/month 1,000 riel up 1,000 riel 
Interest rate on loan 3% member /10% non-member 3% 
Loan clients Member and non-member Members only 
#
 as perceived by the members themselves 
Source: Author 
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capital. It was not uncommon to see villagers gathering around the same division 
discussing agricultural matters, chatting away a slow afternoon, sharing food or a 
popular TV program at a neighbour’s house connected with electricity.  
 
“Villagers are supportive of each other. If I’m busy in the field, the older 
women in the neighboring house can take care of my children and if we 
don’t have enough food during the lean season, others always offer 
help” (Informant 16R). 
 
It has always been a norm for villagers to attend village planning and monthly meetings 
and assist each other during festivals and ceremonial events such as weddings and 
funerals. There have also been collective actions to develop or safeguard the village: 
“There were some land disputes in the past but relations between villagers 
are generally collaborative. Some years ago, with some financial support 
from a local NGO, villagers also built a new road together, improved 
irrigation system and in some sections of the village where roads are 
frequently flooded during the rainy season, there are also collective efforts 
to repair them” (Informant 8R).  
 
“Around five years ago when the harvest crops were stolen from several 
households during the night, male villagers organized themselves and 
established routine foot patrols at night. Since then, there has not been any 
security incident in the village” (Informant 12RM). 
 
As defined earlier, bonding social capital is the connections between people with 
similar demographic characteristics and bridging social capital is the extension of the 
connections. The majority of 155 households in Rieng Village live in mud-and-thatch 
houses across the three divisions of the village. The villagers are ethnically and 
culturally Khmer. Most of the households are impoverished small-land holders, with 
limited assets and livestock. Many of them were also born in the village. And those 
belong to the same kinship often live in the same division of the village and have 
stronger bond in their daily social interaction. This socio-economic homogeneity and 
familiarity about each other are apparent factors behind the strong bonding social 
capital in the village. 
 
The formation of the Rieng Group has had positive impact on both the horizontal and 
vertical networks, not only among members but also between members and non-
members. For example, before the formation of the group, except for those who are 
relatives, immediate neighbours or sharing similar social status, members only knew 
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each other by name. Now members know each other better as the monthly meetings 
allow them to meet often and discuss livelihood issues. Bonding and bridging social 
capital is thus strengthened as the group brings together members from various 
divisions of the village and from different socio-economic status with liked interest to 
save and to borrow among themselves.  
“I knew all the members only by name before. But because I live in wood-
and-tin house, many members feel inferior to talk or visit me. Now they 
come often to my house. I also didn’t know anyone in the neighboring 
village before but now I have to visit every month other villages across the 
province to share my experiences with other savings groups” (Informant 
12RM). 
 
“I’m one of poorest households in this village with no education and no 
other relatives in the village. If it is not because of the savings group, I 
would not have been able to get any loan at all. Although I can’t save 
much or afford to apply the new skills, I want to continue joining the 
group even just for moral support. It is good to know that you are not 
alone and someone is there to listen to you” (Informant 10RM).  
 
For non-members, respondents also expressed improved relations with the group 
members and their relatives. They can now approach the savings group for loan if there 
is money left after members get their loans. Before this, villagers saved their money at 
home or turn to their relatives or those who are better off in the village to borrow 
money in times of need. “Often this is our last resort and as we generally are all poor, 
the request for loans to relatives or neighbors can come at a difficult time for them too. 
It is easier to borrow from the group” (Informant 15R). Although low-interest loan is 
available from the nearest ACLEDA19 bank, many respondents claim that they do not 
trust banks and the transaction costs are too high due to time, travel costs and 
paperwork needed to access the loan. Villagers rather pay 10% interest rate for private 
loans in the village or get loan from the group at the same rate (Informant 8R, 11R, 
15R). Some non-member respondents (Informant 15R, 16R, 21RMH) mentioned that 
they have also learnt new skills from members to improve agricultural output, 
vegetable growing and address domestic violence. The general results of being able to 
reduce expenses from home-grown vegetables, accumulate savings and transfer new 
skills to others has seemingly created more bridging social capital in the village. This 
has also implications on gender relations. 
 
                                                
19
 Association of Cambodian Local Economic Development Agencies, a local NGO in Cambodia. 
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Gender relation is an important aspect of social relations in a patriarchal and 
hierarchical society. In Cambodia, traditional codes of behavior are more elaborate and 
stricter for women than men. While women have less access than men to political or 
economic status, women are traditionally responsible for family expenditures and 
savings (Ledgerwood 1996). It is widely believed that women’s virtuous behavior will 
bring financial success to the family, resulting in some contradictions. While a woman 
is expected to be shy, understanding and not to go out alone, a woman is also expected 
to contribute to family income by engaging in business, which requires going out, 
taking initiatives and being able to bargain (Klaassen 1995). When asked if much has 
changed in gender relations at household and community levels after the formation of 
the Rieng Group, views of the respondents were divided. For most of the group 
members, they made the decision to join the group after discussion with their husbands, 
many of whom were rather skeptical in the beginning about putting money into others 
hand (Informant 12RM, 13RM, 17RM). Most members were skeptical themselves but 
submitted to the encouragement and trust they have in the group leader who is a well 
respected figure in the village and cousin to the village chief. Respondents generally 
feel the participation has given them more financial security and skills to improve their 
household situation (Informant 9RM, 12RM, 13RM, 18RM, 20RM). For the committee 
members, the participation has increased their social confidence (more NGOs are 
consulting them before starting a new project in the village) and reaffirmed their 
decision-making power and control over resources at household and community level 
(Informant 9RM, 12RM). 
“Before my husband was not supportive of me joining the group. Other 
male relatives also spoke behind me as I often had to travel out of the 
village to attend project training and meetings. Although my husband 
never believes them, he now sees that the skills I brought back are helping 
the family produce more and save more money. Other relatives have 
stopped talking against me. I now receive more support from my husband. 
He shares household responsibilities while I’m busy doing the group’s 
work” (Informant 9RM)  
 
“I don’t agree with the old Khmer saying that women cannot even walk 
around the cooking stove or men should not help out in the kitchen. If my 
wife is capable, she can do anything she wants” (Informant 23RMH) 
  
The group secretary and her husband expressed similar view in that she is now more 
confident and have more support from the husband to take on group management 
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responsibility and frequent travel for inter-village training and meetings (Informant 
12RM, 22RMH).  
 
The two group leaders are seen by many respondents in the village as role models for 
other women in the village. They can read and write, have good ideas and contributed a 
lot to their households and the village. Some years ago, using their newly gained 
collective power, they successfully initiated to turn a private pond owned by three 
villagers into a communal pond for fish farming, earning them respect from other 
villagers and enhancing solidarity and cohesion in the village.  
 
Male respondents view women’s networks differently now. “Before, women only 
gather to gossip. Now they seem to be engaged in more productive activities” 
(Informant 21RMH, 22RMH). While respondents (especially male villagers) generally 
indicated support for equal education opportunities for their sons and daughters 
(Informant 9RM, 13RM, 21RMH, 23RMH), female respondents including group 
members (many of whom have never left their village), agree to the traditional gender 
roles and that women should stay at home (Informant 17RM, 18RM, 20RM).  
 
In Cambodia, domestic violence against women is widespread at the village level and 
women rarely seek legal recourse (ADB 2001). In Rieng Village, it tops the list of 
complaints in the village brought to the village chief even though the number of 
incidents has dropped (Informant 8R). Domestic violence is one of the issues Rieng 
Group discussed at their monthly group meeting and also among men and women in the 
village at village meetings or at the Women’s Network meeting organized by CEDAC. 
Although the group alone cannot take credit for the improved situation, women in the 
village said they were more aware of their right and others are more proactive to report 
domestic violence to the police (Informant 9RM, 12RM, 13RM). 
“My husband used to beat me when he needed more money. Although he still 
does that when he’s drunk, I’ve learnt how to handle his aggression. I actually 
reported him to the police last time. I did not dare to do that before” (Informant 
13RM).  
 
Evidently the formation of the savings group has contributed beyond the financial 
benefits to strengthened social bonds and bridges in the village among the group 
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members and between members and non-members. The group has helped create some 
form of linking social capital with other organizations and the local authority. Indeed, 
the peer group development has compensated for the conventional collateral 
requirements among poor villagers seeking microfinance loans. The interaction within 
the group at and beyond their group meetings have created a greater sense of 
community, trust and reliance to cope with stressful times, discuss household problems, 
share social practices and market information. The network has gradually changed 
perceptions of gender roles and established more social bridges and linkages in and 
outside the village as well as with other organizations. While the largely homogenous 
socio-economic status of villagers and existing familiarity about each other in the 
village can explain the high performance of the group, this cannot be taken for granted.  
 
Capable and well-respected leadership matters. In this case, despite being related to the 
village chief and having relatives in the group membership, other members do not see 
that affecting their trust in the group leader as she emphasizes on compliance with 
group rules (see Appendix V for Rieng Group’s rules) and openness of the membership 
to everyone. The fact that the group membership is voluntary and open to everyone in 
the village, the higher interest rates for non-members are the incentives for the latest 
three former loan clients to join the membership. When asked why they remain hesitant 
to join the group, other villagers said they want to have better control of their own 
money, no time to join group meetings, cannot afford to save 1,000 Riel a month, and 
they do not see how their lives can be changed by joining the group. 
 
The supplementary case in Kampong Cham supports the argument that the pre-existing 
barriers to human, financial and social capital limit the potential of the savings group to 
reproduce social capital. The amount of group savings, frequency of loan disbursement 
and thus the total amount of group funds remain stagnant since the formation for the 
group (group record). The poor performance of the group is demotivating both existing 
members to actively participate in the group and non-members to consider 
participation.  
 
In short, the findings from the case study have confirmed that collective activities 
through group-based microfinance have very high potential to reproduce social bonds 
and bridges among rural poor and disadvantaged. While the creation of social capital 
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might not be the primary or explicit goal of group-based microfinance schemes, in the 
process of mobilizing social networks of mostly poor women to save and lend money 
and share information with each other, the project has led to positive changes in the 
lives of the members, as well as those of non-members and in the relations between 
men and women. This is particularly evident in the case of Rieng Group where 
solidarity and trust and family support for participation are strong. In the second group 
where existing social relations and the level of human capital endowment are weak, 
signs of changes to social relations have been rather limited.  
 
5.3 Social intermediation 
The previous section has evidenced the social capital building characteristics of group-
based microfinance. With already the strong presence of positive social capital in Rieng 
Village, how much can we attribute this finding to the social intermediation processes 
promoted by microfinance schemes? This section attempts to answer the second 
research question: How does social intermediation used by the group-based 
microfinance scheme contribute to these changes?  
 
Earlier in the paper, the importance of externality as a critical factor in developing 
positive interactions to feed the common good was discussed. Many well-established 
group-based microfinance schemes combine in one way or another group-based 
organization and skills training with intermediation of financial services. CEDAC’s 
Savings for Self-Reliance project incorporates all these elements and underpins the 
three microfinance paradigms of financial self-sustainability, poverty targeting and 
empowerment. The project has the following purposes:  
 
Table 5. The main purposes of CEDAC’s Saving for Self-Reliance Project 
 
- Mobilizing savings from group members, and making these funds available for the 
provision of loans to group members;  
- Providing the group members (the savers) with an additional source of income from 
interest on their earnings; 
- Providing opportunities to group members to learn from each other, especially, about 
farming and other related enterprises; 
- Developing a culture of solidarity and mutual help among members and non-members; 
and 
- Building mechanisms for collective action in community development practice. 
 
 
Source: CEDAC 2007 
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The project concept is based on building the capacity of the rural poor community 
(poverty targeting) by using development from below approach (empowerment), 
encouraging the community to learn and work together to mobilize and effectively use 
local resources and potentials without, or with minimal reliance on the public sectors, 
NGOs, or private sectors (financial self-sustainability). The project generally selects 
villages with few NGO activities (to avoid duplication), individual lending 
microfinance schemes (to reduce their dependence), and with strong farming practice 
especially where CEDAC has previously provided agricultural training (to build on 
established trust and confidence to ensure social acceptance).  
 
The project first orients the group formation process with interested residents following 
a meeting with all villagers to ensure inclusiveness, a three-month intensive training 
and two-year support. The basic principles of the SfR groups are that groups are 
formed, controlled, owned and sustained by its members. The group determines their 
own regulations on saving, lending and meetings (for example, the minimum saving at 
the start of the group or monthly saving, and the minimum attendance by group 
members at group meetings in a year, etc). External entities may only assist groups in 
terms of awareness-raising, capacity-building with limited management support and 
advice. For sustainability purpose, no extra financial subsidies are provided to the 
groups, except for the initial support to cover the cost of training, workshops and 
exchange visits. According to Berenbach and Guzman (1992), this self-selection-and-
screening feature is the impetus for successful SHMGs as it promotes ownership which 
is a key element in the group’s sustainability.  
 
The project seeks to promote open, non-discriminative, and voluntary membership of 
the savings group to all resident villagers. The project focuses on poor targeting and 
gender equality instead of female targeting although nearly 60% of its members are 
women (CEDAC 2007). There was an issue of the initial lack of outreach as the 
program was built on CEDAC’s previous agricultural intervention and by definition, 
the landless poor were left out as only the farmers’ groups were targeted. Those who 
migrate outside the villages for work were also excluded. CEDAC tried to address this 
issue by forming groups composed of the poorest people in communities. (Parmeshwar 
and Koma 2009) Its intent of creating relatively homogenous groups in terms of socio-
economic status though not explicit remains prevalent.  
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It is assumed, however, that just as all other group-based microfinance methodologies, 
each member will ensure group homogeneity to reduce default risk and to allow the 
group to function with some degree of confidence. In fact, what may appear 
homogenous to outsiders can be significantly different at the local level and easily 
observed by the villagers themselves. In the case of better performed Rieng Group, this 
open, non-discriminative membership approach has helped harness both bonding and 
bridging social capital. The socio-economic differences between members, as they have 
perceived, are wider than among the members of the poorly performed Cham Group 
(see Table 4). Members in the Cham Group are all from the lowest income quartile and 
live in the same division of the village. Only bonding social capital appear to have been 
promoted for the Cham Group as the project targets only the poorest (Informant 
25CM). This approach proved unrealistic for financial sustainability, poverty targeting 
or empowerment paradigms. The rate of dissolution of these groups was much higher 
than the organizational average. Parmeshwar and Koma 2009 argue that the poorest 
tend to be the most vulnerable in terms of their livelihood options, and putting all of 
them together does not decrease their vulnerability. Groups should have internal socio-
economic diversity as in Rieng Group, so that the less vulnerable can support the more 
vulnerable to increase their average resilience to livelihoods shocks (ibid). Mosley 
(1996) offers evidence from Banco Sol in Bolivia that better-off members will exercise 
solidarity with poorer members in heterogeneous groups, affirming again homogeneity 
of groups may not always be a necessary element in effective social intermediation. 
 
While the project emphasizes group ownership, the Cham group leader and group 
members have perceived otherwise and have only allowed villagers from the same 
poverty level to join the group. This has created a dilemma for the group’s development 
given their small size (six members) and limited loan fund for sufficient production 
purpose. Bridging social capital with other divisions of the village could have been 
promoted with further project support.  
 
The project seeks to establish a network and norm that allows group management and 
the peer mechanism to function effectively, by recommending a group size of between 
7 and 25. In practice, the impact of group size on the success of savings and credit 
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groups is unclear (Abbint et al 2006). From the project’s perspective, larger groups 
certainly imply more outreach and higher cost effectiveness. There also exists the 
insurance effect of larger groups against repayment defaults. A smaller group can make 
closer personal relationships and allow frequent contact among members while a larger 
group can be more efficient for conducting savings/credit transactions, and creating a 
sense of common identify among members (Hashemi and Schuler 1997). Buckley 
(1996) however empirically finds that groups of 10 or more members still can work 
effectively. The effect of group size on the creation of social capital is not clear in the 
case of the two savings groups as both are well within the proposed limit and want to 
attract more members to expand the group funds for bigger loans.  
 
The project recommends that each member participates in regular group meetings. 
Gibbons and Kasim (1994) report that Grameen’s experimentation with one-time 
instead of weekly repayment failed to obtain high repayment performance. Regular 
meetings and repayment presumably avoid free-riding and contribute to repeated and 
sustained communication specially important for illiterate members, continued mutual 
monitoring and personal relationships (van Bastelaer 2000), reinforcing the social 
capital build-up.  
 
Like other revolving funds, the project recommends members to save what they can 
and lend their saving at low interest20 to the members of the group. This has the effect 
of transforming beneficiaries into clients through developing and enforcing contracts 
between lender and borrower, and through the support for ownership and control over 
resources by the poorest (Eghcomb and Barton 1999), promoting empowerment and 
collective agency. As the interest builds up in the group fund, the groups can also 
introduce other financial contribution systems, depending on the group’s needs. Some 
groups, including the Rieng Group, have introduced a small institutional fee (around 
100-200 Riels) to cover operating expenses for the start-up of the group. This fee may 
no longer be needed once the group starts to generate income from loan interest. Some 
saving groups have also introduced mutual help or solidarity funds of similar amount or 
voluntary contribution from members to cover unexpected, emerging needs of the 
                                                
20 The interest rate in the saving group is varied from 2-4% per month while the interest rate of money 
lenders is 10-20% per month. The average interest rate of the MFI is 3.5%, but borrowing is complicated 
and involves long procedure. Mostly, the poor reported that they have difficulties to access finance.  
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members, such as serious health problems. In the case of Cham Group, group members 
even contribute funds to establish a village store as a means to generate collective 
income with, however, the group leader taking the sole responsibility of managing the 
store. Although it is naturally easier to do one thing well, the project has been able to 
respond to diverse client needs. As Huppi and Feder (1990) have noted, groups may 
have a better incentive to repay if other social services are combined with savings or 
credit to enhance group accountability and solidarity. 
 
Poverty is not just economical. It is multi-dimensional. Not all poor people are ready or 
have the capacity to establish and maintain a reciprocal contractual relationship around 
the financial transactions without first receiving some form of capacity-building 
assistance (Bennett 1996). The project facilitates the group to put in place a 
participatory management structure, by-laws and regulations. According to Hashemi 
and Schuler (1994), it is critical to ensure that administrative procedures and 
bookkeeping systems developed for group management are simple, transparent and 
within the reach of minimally educated group members. There should also be sufficient 
controls to ensure that group leaders are accountable to the membership, and that all 
members are aware of the status of all loan payments, group funds and individual 
savings. In the two cases of the study, the project has provided record-keeping guidance 
to ensure that the groups conduct and record financial transactions and meeting 
attendance; and that this information is publicly shared with group members at the 
regular group meetings to minimize corruption and suspicion.  
 
Building these management and accountability systems is seen as a critical vehicle 
through which the poor enhances their capabilities while groups build assets and 
autonomy (Eghcomb and Barton 1999). The reality is far from simple. Bennett (1996) 
has introduced participation continuum in which group members can play the role of 
beneficiaries, clients, investors/shareholders and managers according to the level of 
risk members are willing to take. In both cases of Rieng Group and Cham Group, it has 
shown that the poorer the client and the lower his/her human capital endowment, the 
less likely will she/he accept the risk, take loans or devote the time required in group 
activities. Interviews with the respondents illustrate their varying roles along this 
continuum. Contrast to the rules and systems that the Rieng Group has proudly adjusted 
to their situations, the Cham Group has almost accepted entirely the recommendations 
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from CEDAC project staff. The strong dependence on the leadership for the group’s 
development also shows that financial self-sustainability is almost not possible where 
group members remain in the passive beneficiary instead of active client role, as 
Bennett (1996) has noted. In the case of Cham Group, the patron-client (bridging and 
linking social capital) style of dependence on CEDAC’s project staff for establishing 
group rules and regulations appears to be undermining the group’s asset building, 
autonomy and empowerment processes.  
 
Generally, the project also recommends that the net income should be allocated to 
members at the end of the year for collective purposes (e.g. annual party, annual 
exposure trips to other villages, contributions to community development etc) and to 
the reserve funds of the group. Both Rieng Group and Cham Group have not been able 
to do so claiming that the accumulated fund remains small. They will consider it when 
more new members have joined the group and the volume of group income has 
increased. The project also recommends that sufficient time is allocated for the group to 
share information and experiences at each meeting (in farming and other business 
activities) as well as to discuss other collective actions than saving and credit. Other 
experienced people could also be invited to attend the meeting and share their good 
practices in farming and other income-generating activities. For the Rieng Group, the 
contribution to community development is not just financial. Using the collective 
identity, the group has successfully initiated the conversion of a privately owned pond 
in the village into one for communal fish-farming purpose (Informant 9RM, 12RM). 
The members have learnt to share certain implicit and explicit group values and using 
the foundation of social norms and mutual trust to achieve common purposes under 
certain circumstances. Observations reveal that group members do not often share 
knowledge resources as recommended for groups’ monthly meeting. Discussions were 
limited to financial transactions especially during busy planting seasons. The 
strengthened social bonds and bridges among members and with community members 
mean that learning is rather fostered in informal settings.  
 
The project also encourages the savings groups within the village and between villages 
to form networks, associations or unions. CEDAC assists to ensure that such 
cooperation does not lead to elite capture or control. The intra-village cooperation is 
the formation of a village-based saving groups committee from networks or unions of 
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groups within the same village. The committee should elect one competent member to 
be Village-based Saving Groups Animator (VSA). The committee determines the 
mandate and the role and responsibilities of the VSA. Similarly, all saving groups from 
one village are supported to cooperate with other neighboring villages. All VSAs will 
form a working committee at the inter-village or commune level. The VSA will elect 
the most competent and committed VSA to be the Inter-village saving group animator 
(ISA) or the Commune-based saving groups animator (CSA). Although this intra and 
inter-village structure is still at early stage, the project envisions that this will have 
significant effect in building institutional social links as this local network could 
promote collective action for mutual learning, sharing and empowerment among 
villagers and villages. (CEDAC 2008) In the Rieng Group, the group secretary herself 
is a VSA and is often engaged in inter-village experience sharing and lessons learnt 
activities, bringing new knowledge resources and bring linking social networks to the 
group and the village.  
 
CEDAC believes that in the long-run, if well administered and developed by the 
community, the local network could have the potential to be developed or merged into 
formal local savings and credit cooperatives and even beyond the commune or inter-
village level to district, provincial or national savings and credit unions linked with 
other saving networks. (CEDAC 2008) This is expected to be able to scale up financial 
self-sustainability, poverty targeting and empowerment deliverables. The project is 
focusing on strengthening linking social capital through increasing engagement with 
local government entities.  
 
In analyzing the CEDAC’s project strategies, the study has also revealed that the 
formation of social capital is not a natural outcome of group-based microfinance. Peer 
mechanism alone cannot guarantee inclusion of the poorest or poorer members of the 
community. Well-designed social intermediation strategies play a pivotal role in the 
creation of positive social capital and effective transformation of beneficiaries to 
clients. From initiating group formation, encouraging non-discriminative membership 
selection, setting group size limits, building skills to ensure accountable and 
participatory group management practices, and linking intra- and inter-village level 
networks and norms, CEDAC’s social intermediation measures have been designed 
towards full ownership and sustainability. The case study has shown that social 
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intermediation processes are necessary to ensure poor targeting. It also shows that 
homogeneity of the group may not be the necessary element in social capital formation. 
Using a group of members from different social strata as a platform to share farming 
techniques, health and family issues has the effect of enhancing linking social capital 
with local leadership structures, police, the health sector and other NGOs. The thesis 
has also reviewed that the downside of social capital needs to be tackled, particularly in 
promoting bonds among only poorest people and patron-client relationship between 
project staff and the group.  
 
5.4 Organizational capacity for community development 
As the previous section explains, a strong argument for social intermediation strategies 
is that they have the potential of not only creating mechanisms for financial 
intermediation, but also empowering the more disenfranchised citizens by establishing 
local institutions that is inclusive, can serve local needs, harness local control and 
contribute to wider economic and social development of the community. CEDAC’s SfR 
project explicitly aims to build mechanisms for collective action in community 
development practice. This section is to explore: What implications do the outcomes of 
these social intermediation processes have for the capacity of the poor and 
disadvantaged to organize for wider community development?  
 
Two critical principles are embedded in any community-driven development (CDD) 
projects, that is, community-level participation and accountability arrangements. These 
two principles can help to ensure that the benefits of development flow to the 
community as a whole and more specifically to the poor (UNCDF 1999). The case 
study of the Rieng Group has shown that a poor community can generate strong 
bonding and bridging social capital among themselves with external support and carry 
out collective actions successfully beyond the benefits of loans and savings in the 
village. The orientation meeting with all villagers ensures the access to the information 
of the project is not limited to village elites, and that the membership is open to the 
poor and disadvantaged. In the presence of endogenous community imperfections, as 
Platteau and Abraham (2002) call it, households whose members are more involved in 
community activities (better social capital) and have more family support (for women) 
are more likely to influence the group formation and take on active role in decision-
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making. The group leader and secretary of Rieng Group are both better educated and in 
the upper poor, with the former being niece to the village chief and active in village 
affairs. The participation of socio-economically heterogeneous members reveals a 
promising prospect for a sustainable and inclusive community development. 
 
To avoid elite capture, project procedures put strong emphasis on broad participation of 
members in decision making, democratic leadership selection to the group committee 
that manage the group funds, and transparency of financial transactions to help avoid 
corruption or fraud. The Rieng Group has evidently taken full ownership of its 
management and regulations by not simply adopting what CEDAC has recommended. 
There is a general sense of identity and empowerment among the group members. Not 
only are there economic benefits to improve living conditions, democratic and 
participatory management practices have encouraged usually passive members to speak 
for their right and interest. “We would not have made the group working without our 
leader or as individuals.” (FGD 1R, 3C)  
 
In addition, the group has accumulated significant funds to give them a stronger status 
and negotiation power on village matters. The skills training, contingency fund, regular 
cooperation and information sharing among members have created a strong sense of 
belonging to a community, solidarity and trust in time of crisis. The success of the 
group has also slowly influenced the landscape of gender relations in the village. Not 
only has the group broadened its social bridges with other villagers by offering them 
loan access and sharing their agricultural skills, the entire village has benefited from 
their collective action of initiating a communal pond for fish-farming or setting up a 
store to ease villagers from traveling afar for household supplies. The groups have also 
become the first point of consultation for other NGO projects in the village.  
 
In fact in the case of Rieng Group, what appears critical is not the elite capture but how 
the elite themselves behave in favor or against the poor or disadvantaged (Mansuri and 
Rao 2004). The democratic election has resulted in better motivated individual being 
selected. When asked why spent so much time and energy on the group management, 
the group leader said, “I want to bring more development to the village and help the 
poorest and disadvantaged women. I like to learn new things. To ensure the poorer ones 
benefit, I never take loans myself so others have better chances to access loans in the 
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group.” (Informant 9RM) “There is still a lot to do to convince other villagers to join 
the group. When we have more funds in the group, we could loosen the minimum 
monthly savings and allow poorer members to join,” (Informant 12RM). The 
heterogeneity in this local context enhances social bonds, bridges and links.  
 
The Rieng Group members also actively participate in another women’s network 
facilitated by CEDAC which focuses on health education, family planning, women’s 
rights and domestic violence. The group leader takes an active role in this network and 
her house has become the meeting centre for both the monthly group meetings and 
women network meetings. Most of the participants in the network meeting are also 
Rieng Group members. 
 
Indeed, as Eghcom and Barton (1999) have noted, social intermediation seems to 
promise the removal of physical, economic and social barriers for the poor and 
disadvantaged. The downside of social capital, however, cannot be undermined. The 
minimum amount of monthly savings and distrust in the group continues to hold back 
poorest or migrant households from joining the groups (Informant 11R, 15R). In Cham 
Village, as the socio-economic homogeneity of the group (all categorized as poorest 
households) appears to have limited the group in creating extended horizontal 
(bridging) and vertical social networks (linking) outside the group. While the 
membership is only limited to poorest households, the group rules require that any new 
member has to contribute first the same level of savings as accumulated by older 
members. When asked if this membership requirement limits group development, the 
group leader said, “I don’t know. We just follow the advice from CEDAC project 
staff.” (Informant 25CM) 
 
From focus group discussions and individual interviews, both groups’ members 
expressed satisfaction with the groups’ leadership, rules and regulations. When asked 
how the group can develop further, most respondents said they wanted the loan funds to 
grow but pointed to the responsibility of the group leadership to expand the 
membership (FGD 1R, 2C). While all shared the financial and social benefits of joining 
the group, mainly the leadership of Rieng Group expressed a strong sense of 
empowerment after joining the group and envisioned a role of the group in broader 
community development when the group’s loan fund grows. Given the short time 
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horizon of the two groups, it is not surprising to see that most group members remain 
focused on pursuing individual economic gain before the development of common 
goods for other poorer and disadvantaged villagers. The belief in collective agency as 
the main force to improve the village conditions was felt among respondents in Rieng 
Village (FGD 1R, 2R) whereas respondents in Cham Village generally pointed to the 
initiation of the authorities and NGOs (FGD 3C).  
 
Despite the presence of strong social bonds in Rieng Village, the case study shows that 
proper social intermediation processes are essential to ensure the manifestation of these 
social bonds is in support of the poor and disadvantaged. These manifestations, if 
administered in participatory and transparent manner and linked with other institutions, 
can influence the type of elite control and allow the poor and disadvantaged especially 
women to work together and organize themselves for wider community development.  
 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
 
 
Poverty is widely defined by development researchers and practitioners as the 
manifestation of exclusion, powerlessness and voicelessness (Kabeer 2003; Mikkelsen 
2005:204). With three billion people still lacking access to rural finance in the world, 
SHMG models represent an innovative bottom-up development approach that offers 
hope and excitement in the development sphere. The thesis has subjected some of the 
key dimensions of social capital formation of group-based microfinance models to 
empirical testing. The case study in Rieng Village has asserted this excitement of 
bringing about economic and social improvement to a hierarchical, post-conflict 
context through processes that intermediate the exploitation, intermediation and 
reproduction of bonding, bridging and linking social capital.  
 
The study has provided evidence to the following argument:  
• group-based microfinance scheme can bring positive changes to social and gender 
relations; 
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• social intermediation processes have huge influence on the type of social capital 
(norms, networks and trust) promoted in group-based microfinance schemes to the 
benefit or disbenefit of the poor and marginalized; and 
• the social capital build up, especially where structural and institutional exclusion is 
addressed to harness all bonding, bridging and linking social capital has the 
potential of enabling the poor and marginalized to organize themselves for wider 
community development.  
 
The case study has shown that microfinance is not only about providing low-cost 
alternative of loan or saving but also about breaking the vicious circle of institutional 
exclusion, giving a collective voice, a group identity and mutual support to the poor and 
disadvantaged. Through processes that focus initially on economic enhancement, 
followed by individual and group empowerment, and leading to collective action in the 
community, a self-reliant, transparent, participatory and sustainable mechanism can be 
established to bridge the gaps in the society created by poverty, illiteracy, gender 
inequality and remoteness. The study has shown that group-based microfinance model 
can be a viable and powerful tool to empower marginalized people and community, and 
to foster equal gender power relations from the grass-roots level.  
 
As many researchers have said, microfinance however should be seen as a panacea to 
development. It does not automatically create positive social capital. Microfinance 
schemes need to incorporate strategies and measures that not only enhance bonding and 
bridging social capital, they also have to forge structural, institutional or linking social 
capital. This requires cautious mobilization, engagement and capacity-building of 
members across social economic strata. This thesis has provided a better understanding 
of how these processes influence the type of networks, norms and trust exploited, 
mediated and harnessed; and the conditions that produce self efficacy and social capital 
which in turn and in time could empower the poor and the marginalized to participate 
and organize themselves in the community development and society transformation 
processes. 
 
The experiences presented in this study are limited to two savings groups in Cambodia, 
and, though they may not be representative of all savings groups in Cambodia, they 
Rethinking Social Capital in Development: Can Group-Based Microfinance reproduce Social Capital?  
A Case Study in Rural Cambodia 
52/63 
refer to traditional social network, trust and norms that are typical in the country. By 
providing a rich and contextual data of particular savings groups, it would also be 
reasonable to say that similar findings can be observed elsewhere where group-based 
microfinance has been heavily promoted. The analyses in the paper hopefully provide 
useful information about what constitutes effective and inclusive social intermediation 
design and strategies. It is also hoped that the study has contributed one way or another 
to the ongoing research and debate about social capital, and further dialogue between 
researchers, policymakers, practitioners and among the poor themselves to improve 
civil society participation in community development.  
 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Abbink K., Bernd I. and Renner E. (2006). “Group Size and Social Ties in Microfinance 
Institutions”. Economic Inquiry. 44:4, October.  
 
Agrawal A. (1999). Decentralization in Nepal: A Comparative Analysis, Oakland: ICS Press. 
 
Asia Resource Centre for Microfinance (ARCM) Cambodia Country Profile. 
http://www.bwtp.org/arcm/cambodia/I_Country_Profile/cambodia_country_profile.htm 
(consulted February 2009) 
 
Asian Development Bank (2001). Cambodia Participatory Poverty Assessment.  
 
Bantilan M. C. S. and Padmaja R. (2008). “Empowerment through social capital build-up: 
gender dimensions in technology uptake”. Experimental Agriculture, 44 (2008):61-80  
 
Bennett L. (1996). “Social  Intermediation: Building  Systems  and  Skills  for  Sustainable  
Financial Intermediation With the Poor.”  Washington, D.C.: The World Bank’s 
Sustainable Banking with the Poor project, Rural Finance Seminar: May 1. 
 
Bennett L., Goldberg M., and Von Pischke J. D. (1994).  “Basing Access on Performance to 
Create Sustainable Financial Services for the Poor in Nepal.” Prepared for Conference on 
“Financial Services and the Poor” at The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., 
September 28-30. 
 
Berenbach S. and Guzman D. (1992). The Solidarity Group Experience Worldwide. 
Washington, D.C.: ACCION International.  
 
Besley T., Coate S., and Loury G. (1993). “The Economics of Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations.” American Economic Review 83: 782-810. 
 
Brinkerhoff D. and Goldsmith A. (2000). “Participation in Macroeconomic Policy: Experience 
and Implications for Poverty Reduction Strategies”, in Action Learning Program on 
Rethinking Social Capital in Development: Can Group-Based Microfinance reproduce Social Capital?  
A Case Study in Rural Cambodia 
53/63 
Participatory Processes for Poverty Reduction Strategies. Draft. World Bank. 
Washington. 
 
Bryman A. (2004). Social Research Methods, Oxford, Oxford University Press  
 
Bourdieu P. (1986). “Forms of Capital”. In: Handbook of Theory and Research for the 
Sociology of Education, J. C. Richards, ed. New York: Greenwood Press. 
 
Buckley G. (1996). “Micro-finance in Africa: is it either the problem or the solution?” World 
Development 25:1081-1093. 
 
Bushra E. and Lopez P. (1994). “Development in Conflict: the Gender Dimension”. Report of 
an Oxfam AGRA East workshop held in Pattaya, Thailand, 1-4 February 1993. 
Cambodian Council for Social Development (CSD) (2002). National Poverty Reduction 
Strategy 2003-2005. Kingdom of Cambodia. 
CEDAC (2006). Baseline Survey of the Saving for Self-Reliance Initiative in Cambodia. 
September 2006. 
 
CEDAC (2007). “Conceptual Orientation and Guiding Principles for the Building the capacity 
of Saving for Self-Reliance Networks in Cambodia”. Internal workshop paper. 8-10 
January 2007.  
CEDAC (2008). CEDAC Saving for Self-Reliance Project Concept Paper.  
CIA (2009). The World Factbook: Cambodia. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-
world-factbook/geos/cb.html#People (consulted February 2009) 
 
Chandararot K. (2002). “The Development of Microfinance in Cambodia”. Cambodia 
development Review, 6(3) July-September. 
 
Colletta N. and Cullen M. (2000). Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social 
Capital:Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia, The World Bank, 
Washington D. C. 
 
Coleman J. (1988). “Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital.” American Journal of 
Sociology, 94: 95-120. 
 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP). “What Do We Know about the Impact of 
Microfinance?” http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.1306/ (consulted in 
February 2009) 
 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) (2007). “How Will Technology Expand Access 
to Finance? Cutting edge experiments in eight countries to seek answers” Feature article. 
February 15, 2007 
 
Creswell J. W. (2007). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among Five 
Approaches, Thousand Oaks, Sage 
 
Dasgupta A. and Serageldin I. (2001). Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. Washington 
DC: World Bank. 
 
Rethinking Social Capital in Development: Can Group-Based Microfinance reproduce Social Capital?  
A Case Study in Rural Cambodia 
54/63 
Dasgupta A. and Beard A. V. (2007). “Community Driven Development, Collective Action and 
Elite Capture in Indonesia” Development and Change, 38 (2) (March 2007): 229-249. 
 
Davenport P., Healy J. and Malone K. (1995). Vulnerable in the Village: a Study of Returneesin 
Battambang Province, Cambodia, with a Focus on Strategies for the Landless (Phnom 
Penh: Lutheran World Service, UNHCR & Japan Sotoshu Relief Committee) 
 
Desai V. and Potter R. B. (2006). Doing Development Research, Sage Publications, 
London/TRThousand Oaks/New Delhi  
 
Dewalt B. R. and Dewalt K. M. (2002). Participant Observation: a guide for fieldworkers, 
Wallnut Creek: Ca Altamira Press/ Roman and Littlefield Press 
 
Diamond D. W. (1984). “Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring.” Review of 
Economic Studies 51(3): 393-414. 
 
Dudwick N., Kuehnast K., Jones V. N., and Woolcock M. (2006). Analyzing Social Capital in 
Context: A Guide to Using Qualitative Methods and Data. World Bank Institute. 
Washington D.C.  
Edgcomb E. and Barton L. (1998). “Social Intermediation and Microfinance Programs: A 
Literature Review” Micro Enterprise Innovation Project (MIP), USAID. 
Edward P. and Olsen W. (2006). “Paradigms and Reality in Micro-Finance: The Indian Case” 
Perspectives on Global Development and Technology, 5, issue 1-2:31-54 
 
Esman M. J. and Uphoff N. T. (1984). Local Organizations: Intermediaries in Rural 
Development, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. 
 
Falk I. and Kilpatrick S. (1999). “What is Social Capital?: A Study of Interaction in a Rural 
Community.”  Paper D5/1999 in the CRLRA Discussion Paper Series. June 1999. 
 
Fernando J. L. (2006). Microfinance: perils and prospects. Routledge. 
 
Garforth C. and Munro M. (1995). Rural People’s Organisations and Agriculture Development 
in the Upper North Thailand. AERDD, The University of Reading. 
 
Ghatak M. and Guinnane T. (1999). “The Economics of Lending with Joint Liability: A 
Review of Theory and Practice,” Journal of Development Economics 60, (October 1999): 
195-228. 
 
Gibbons S. D. and Kasim S. (1994) Banking On The Rural Poor. Dhaka: Grameen Bank. 
 
Goetz A. M. and Gupta R. S. (1996). “Who Takes the Credit? Gender, Power, and Control over 
Loan Use in Rural Credit Programs in Bangladesh”. World Development 24(1), 45-63 
 
Grootaert C. (1997). “Social Capital: The Missing Link?” In Expanding the Measure of Wealth: 
Indicators of Environmentally Sustainable Development. Environmentally Sustainable 
Development Studies and Monographs Series No. 7. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
Grootaert C. and van Bastelaer T. (2001). “Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: A 
Synthesis of Findings and Recommendations from the Social Capital Initiative.” Social 
Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 24. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
 
Rethinking Social Capital in Development: Can Group-Based Microfinance reproduce Social Capital?  
A Case Study in Rural Cambodia 
55/63 
Grootaert C., Narayan D., Jones V. N. and Woolcock M. (2005). “Measuring Social Capital: 
An Integrated Questionnaire”. World Bank Working Paper No. 18. Washington, DC: The 
World Bank. 
 
Hashemi S. M. and Schuler S. R. (1997). “Sustainable Banking with the Poor: A Case Study of 
the Grameen Bank.” JSI Working Paper No. 10. Arlington, Virginia: JSI Research and 
Training Institute, June. 
Hulme D. and Mosley P. (1996). Finance Against Poverty. London: Routledge  
Huppi M. and Feder G. (1990). “The Role of Groups and Credit Cooperatives in Rural 
Lending”. The World Bank Research Observer, 5 (2), July. 
 
Ito S. (2003). “Microfinance and Social Capital: Does Social Capital Help Create Good 
Practice?” Development in Practice, 13 (4), August 2003, 322 - 332 
 
Kabeer N. (2001). “Resources, agency, achievements: reflections on the measurement of 
women’s empowerment”, in Discussing Women’s Empowerment – Theory and Practice, 
SIDA Studies No. 3. 
 
Kabeer N. (2003). “Part III: Wider Social Impacts: Assessing the Wider Social Impacts of 
Microfinance Services: Concepts, Methods, Findings”. IDS Bulletin 34 (4): 106-114. 
 
Kabeer N. and Murthy R. K. (1996). “Compensating for institutional exclusion? Lessons from 
Indian government and non-government credit interventions for the poor,” IDS 
Discussion Paper 356. Brighton, UK: Institute of Development Studies, University of 
Sussex. 
 
Kalan S. (2001). “Social Capital and Group Banking”. MIT Department of Economics. 
September 18, 2001.  
 
Kanak S. and Iiguni Y. (2007). “Microfinance Programs and Social Capital Formation: The 
Present Scenario in a Rural Village of Bangladesh”. The International Journal of Applied 
Economics and Finance. 1 (2): 97-104 
 
Klaassen H. (1995). “Cambodian Women in Socio-Economic Transition”. Cambodian 
Researchers for Development. Cambodia.  
Krishna A. and Uphoff N. (1999). Mapping and Measuring Social Capital: A Conceptual and 
Empirical Study of Collective Action for Conserving and Developing Watersheds in 
Rajasthan, India. Social Capital Initiative WP Series #13. Washington, D.C.: World 
Bank. 
Krishna A. (2000). Organizing in Support of CDD: Information is the Key Resource. Cornell 
University. Ithaca. N.Y. 
 
Kvale S. (1996). Interviews: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing, USA: Sage 
Publications 
 
Ledgerwood J. L. (1996). “Politics and Gender: Negotiating Conceptions of the Ideal Women 
in Present Day Cambodia”. Asia Pacific Viewpoint, 37 (2), August 1996, 139-152.  
 
Rethinking Social Capital in Development: Can Group-Based Microfinance reproduce Social Capital?  
A Case Study in Rural Cambodia 
56/63 
Mansuri G. and Rao V. (2004). Community-based and driven development: A critical review. 
The World Bank Research Observer. 19(1), 1-39. 
 
Marshall G. (1998). “Non-participant Observation”. In A Dictionary of Sociology. Oxford 
University Press 1998. 
 
Matthews B. (2005). Towards safety and Self-Reliance: Community Finance and Public Trust 
in Rural Cambodia. Working Paper Series 2005/2. Canadian Co-operative Association. 
 
Mayoux L. (1998). “Women's Empowerment and Micro-finance Programmes: Approaches, 
Evidence and Ways Forward”. DPP Working Paper No 41. Milton Keynes: The Open 
University. 
 
Mayoux L. (2000). “Micro-finance and the Empowerment of Women: A Review of the Key 
Issues”. Social Finance Unit Working Paper No 23. Geneva: ILO. 
 
Mayoux L. (2001). Learning for Empowerment Action through Participation (LEAP): 
Inception Report. New Delhi, PRADAN. 
 
Mayoux L. (2005). “Tackling the Downside: Social Capital, Women's Empowerment and 
Micro-Finance in Cameroon”. Development and Change 32 (2001): 435-464. 
 
Meas N. (1995). Toward Restoring Life, Cambodian Villages, translated and transcribed by 
Joan Healy. Phnom Penh: Krom Akphiwat Phum.  
 
Meas, N. (1999). The Concept of Community. Conference on the Meaning of Community in 
Cambodia, Pnom Penh, 7-8 June. 
 
Microenterprise Best Practices (MBP) (2001). “Developing a Post-Conflict Microfinance 
Industry: The Case of Cambodia”. MBP Microfinance Following Conflict Brief No 2. 
http://www.gdrc.org/icm/disasters/Developing.pdf (consulted February 2009) 
 
Mikkelsen B. (2005). Methods for Development Work and Research: A new guide for 
practitioners. New Delhi, Sage Publications 
 
Ministry of Planning (MoP) and United Nations Development Program (UNDP) (2007). 
Cambodia Human Development Report 2007: Expanding Choices for Rural People.  
Phnom Penh.  
 
Ministry of Women’s Affairs (2008). A Fair Share Women: Cambodia Gender Assessment. 
Phnom Penh. April 2008 
 
Montgomery R. and Hulme D. ( 1996). “Credit for the Poor in Bangladesh”. In Hulme and 
Mosley eds 1996. Finance Against Poverty. London: Routledge.  
 
Montgomery R. (1996). “Disciplining or Protecting the Poor? Avoiding the Social Costs of 
Peer Pressure in Micro-Credit Schemes”. Journal of International Development, 8 (2), 
Wiley, U.K.  
 
Mosley P. (1996). “Metamorphosis From NGO to Commercial Bank: The Case of BancoSol in 
Bolivia”, pp. 1-31 in David Hulme and Paul Mosley (eds) Finance Against Poverty: 
Volume II, London: Routledge. 
 
Narayan D. (1999). Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and poverty. Poverty Group, PREM 
World Bank. 
Rethinking Social Capital in Development: Can Group-Based Microfinance reproduce Social Capital?  
A Case Study in Rural Cambodia 
57/63 
 
North D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Olsen M. E. (1982). Participatory pluralism. Chicago: Nelson-Hall. 
 
Pact (2004). Savings Led and Self-Help Microfinance in Cambodia: Lessons Learnt and Best 
Practices. August 2004.  
 
Parmeshwar V. and Koma Y. S. (2009). “Retrofitting an Agricultural Program with Savings-led 
Microfinance: Oxfam experience in Cambodia”. Discussion paper in Microfinance from 
below: The Power of Savings and Savings Groups in Frontier Economies conference 
papers and blog. March 26-28 2009. The Fletch School. 
http://fletchermicrofinance.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=28&Item
id=58 (consulted May 2009) 
 
Pellini A. and Ayres D. (2005). “Social Capital and Village Governance: Experiences with 
Village Networks”. A Discussion Paper for GTZ. November 2005. 
  
Platteau J. P. and Abraham A. (2002). “Particpatory development in the presence of 
endogenous community imperfections”. Journal of Development Studies, 39(2), 104-136. 
 
Portes A. (1998). “Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology.” Annual 
Review of Sociology 24 (1998):1-24. 
 
Putnam R. (1993). “The Prosperous Community — Social Capital and Public Life.” American 
Prospect (13): 35-42. Ragin C (1994): Constructing Social Research: the Unity and 
Diversity of Method, Thousand Oaks, Pine Forge Press 
Putnam R. D. (2000). “Bowling alone”. In The collapse and revival of American community. 
New York, NY: Simon and Schuster. 
Quiria M. G. (2003). “The Puzzle of Social Capital: A Critical Review”. Asian Development 
Review. 20 (2): 19-38  
 
Ragin C. C. (1994). Constructing social research: the unity and diversity of method. Thousand 
Oaks: Pine Forge. 
Rahman A. (1999). “Micro-credit Initiatives for Equitable and Sustainable Development: Who 
Pays?”. World Development 27(1): 67-82. 
Rankin K. N. (2002). “Social Capital, Microfinance, and the Politics of Development”. 
Feminist Economics 1 March 2002, 8 (1): 1-24. 
Rural Development Bank of Cambodia (RDB) (2003). “Rural Credit in Cambodia”. 
http://www.rdb.com.kh/ruralcredit.htm (consulted February 2009) 
 
Sebstad J. N., Barnes C. and Chen G. (1995). “Assessing the Impacts of Micro-enterprise 
Interventions: A Framework for Analysis”. Washington, DC: USAID/AIMS. 
 
Sedara K. (2001). Reciprocity: Informal Patterns of Social Interaction in a Cambodian Village 
Near Angkor Park. Master’s Thesis, Department of Anthropology, Northern Illinois 
University.  
Rethinking Social Capital in Development: Can Group-Based Microfinance reproduce Social Capital?  
A Case Study in Rural Cambodia 
58/63 
 
Serageldin I. and Grootaert C. (2000). “Defining social capital: an integrating view”. In 
Dasgupta P and Serageldin I (2001) Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. The 
World Bank Washington DC.  
 
Stiglitz J. E. (1990). “Peer monitoring and credit markets”. World Bank Economic Review 4 
(3): 351–66. 
Szabo S. (1999). Social intermediation study: field research guide: exploring the relationship 
between social capital and microfinance. The World Bank. 
Szreter S. and Woolcock M. (2004). “Health by association? Social capital, social theory, and 
the political economy of public health”. International Journal of Epidemiology 33 
(2004): 650–67 
 
Transparency International (2008). Corruption Perceptions Index for 2008 
(http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/cpi/2008) (consulted 
April 2009) 
 
UNCDF (1999). Taking risks: Background papers. New York: United Nations Capital 
Development Fund. 
 
UNICEF  (1996).  Towards  a  Better  Future:  An  Analysis  of  the  Situation  of  Children  
and  Women in Cambodia. Phnom Penh.  
 
van Bastelaer T. (1999). “Does Social Capital Facilitate the Poor's Access to Credit? A Review 
of the Microeconomic Literature”, Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 9, The 
World Bank. 
 
van Bastelaer T. (2000). “Imperfect Information, Social Capital and The Poor’s Access to 
Credit”. IRIS Center Working Paper No. 234, University of Maryland, Center on 
Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS). 
 
Varian H. (1990). “Monitoring Agents With Other Agents,” Journal of Institutional and 
Theoretical Economics 146(1): 153-74. 
 
Wilson K. (2002). “The New Microfinance: An Essay on the Self-Help Group Movement in 
India”. Journal of Microfinance, 4(2): 217-245. 
 
Woolcock M. (1998). “Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical 
synthesis and policy framework”. Theory and Society. 27 (1998): 151-208 
 
Woolcock M. and Narayan D. (2000). “Social Capital: Implications for Development Theory, 
Research, and Policy”. World Bank Research Observer, 2000, 15 (2): 225-49  
 
World Bank (2006). Cambodia Halving Poverty by 2015?: Poverty Assessment Report 2006. 
Phnom Penh. February 2006. 
 
Yin R. (2003). Case Study Research: Design and Methods, Thousands Oaks, Sage 
 
 
 
Rethinking Social Capital in Development: Can Group-Based Microfinance reproduce Social Capital?  
A Case Study in Rural Cambodia 
59/63 
APPENDIX I – Group-Based Organization Models 
 
 
Source: Eghcomb and Barton 1998: 10, Table 1 
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APPENDIX II – List of Interviewees and Focus Group Meetings 
  
 Title Organization Date 
Informant 1 Program Officer Oxfam America  10.10.2008 
Informant 2 Research Advisor AMK 4.11.2008 
Informant 3 WORTH Program Director PACT Cambodia 2.11.2008 
Informant 4 Saving for Self Reliance project 
coordinator 
CEDAC 2.11.2008 
29.11.2008 
Informant 5 CFI coordinator PADEK 2.11.2008 
Informant 6 Svay Rieng project staff CEDAC 23.11.2008 
Informant 7 Kampong Cham project staff CEDAC 1.12.2008 
Rieng 
Interviewees 
Identity Sex Age Education Date 
Informant 8R Village Chief M 62 G7 24.11.2008 
Informant 9RM Group leader F 49 G4 25.11.2008 
Informant 10RM Group member F 66 Nil 25.11.2008 
Informant 11R Non-member, divorced F 40 n/a 26.11.2008 
Informant 12RM Group secretary F 40 G7 25.11.2008 
Informant 13RM Group member F 35 G3 26.11.2008 
Informant 14R Non-member, new to village M 30s n/a 26.11.2008 
Informant 15R Non-member, member’s neighbour M 54 G7 26.11.2008 
Informant 16R Non-member, wife to Informant 
15R 
F 52 Nil 26.11.2008 
Informant 17RM Member F 40 G1 26.11.2008 
Informant 18RM Member, sister to Informant 17RM F 23 n/a 26.11.2008 
Informant 19RMH Husband to Informant 13RM M 49 Nil 27.11.2008 
Informant 20RM Committee member, midwife F 53 G3 27.11.2008 
Informant 21RMH Husband to Informant 20RM M 82 G5 27.11.2008 
Informant 22RMH Husband to Informant 12RM M 43 n/a 27.11.2008 
Informant 23RMH Husband to Informant 9RM M 52 G1 25.11.2008 
Cham 
Interviewees 
Identity Sex Age Education Date 
Informant 24C Village chief M 60s n/a 2.12.2008 
Informant 25CM Group leader F 29 G3 2.12.2008 
Informant 26CM Member, cousin to Informant 
25CM 
F 44 G6 19.12.2008 
Informant 27CM Member F 43 G1 2.12.2008 
Informant 28CM Member M 28 G5 2.12.2008 
Informant 29CM Member F 48 Nil  
Informant 30C Former member of a suspended 
group 
F 57 n/a 3.12.2008 
Informant 31C Former group leader of a 
suspended group 
F 50s n/a 3.12.2008 
Informant 32C Non-member F 60s Nil 3.12.2008 
Focus group 
discussion 
Group description Participants Date 
FGD 1R Rieng Group 3 members 10.12.2008 
FGD 2R Rieng non-members  5-6 neighbors 27.11.2008 
FGD 3C Cham Group 6 members 3.12.2008 
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APPENDIX III – Interview and Group Discussions Guide  
 
Key informants Interview Guide (not audio-taped) 
- background, achievements and challenges of microfinance sector  
- background, achievements and challenges of group models 
 
Focus Discussions Guide (not audio-taped.) 
- reasons of joining the group 
- satisfaction with group rules and regulations 
- satisfaction with leadership 
- biggest benefit of joining the group 
- influence of CEDAC project activities and guidelines 
- vision of the group 
- common community problems 
- possible solutions 
- any changes needed for the group 
- who’s responsible to bring these changes 
 
Semi-structured Interview Guide (audio-taped) 
- demographic information of interviewee, household and livelihood situation 
- reasons of joining the group 
- decision-making process of participation 
- biggest benefit of the group formation: individual, household and community 
- changes to livelihood situations  
- changes to social and gender relations 
- changes to political participation 
- influence of CEDAC project activities and guidelines on these changes 
- perceptions of the saving group 
- any changes needed for self, family and community 
- how can these changes happen 
 
Rethinking Social Capital in Development: Can Group-Based Microfinance reproduce Social Capital?  
A Case Study in Rural Cambodia 
62/63 
APPENDIX IV – Key facts and figures about CEDAC’s Savings for 
Self Reliance Project  
 
By May 2008, CEDAC’s Self Reliance the project was operating in 14 of Cambodia’s 
24 provinces and municipalities. There were more than 2,900 saving groups with 
44,000 active members and some 1,300 village saving animators trained, indicating a 
rapid scale-up in just few years. The total amount of savings was close to one million 
USD (3,900 million Cambodia Riels) (CEDAC 2008) According to a 2006 baseline 
survey, 57% members were women, an average group had 16 members with an average 
loan fund of 130 USD (500,000 Riels), 87% of which was on loan outstanding. An 
average loan size was about 5 USD and each group on average had one late loan. 
Group members were from different economic strata with the poorest households 
owning 300 USD in assets. About 16% of members missed out on saving payment 
while 12% were late with saving payment, largely due to shortage of income or money. 
Interestingly, this was more common among the better off members. About 5% of the 
groups, mostly groups with more educated and better off members, have trained other 
new groups (CEDAC 2006).  
 
Not only has the success of the project drawn increasing attention and recognition from 
local authorities but also additional funding from Oxfam America to help expand the 
project to focus on the poorest and other parts of Cambodia, especially in the ethnic 
minority areas. 
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APPENDIX V – The rules of Rieng Group  
 
(Translated from Khmer) 
1. All of us join to save lots of money for each of us to take a loan for each family to do business. This 
group is named “Rieng Group”.  
2. Persons who can be members are those who are honest and the permanent residents of the village.  
3. The saving group should have 5 up to 25 members.  
4. Each member of the Saving Group should deposit money once a month. 
5. Each member should save a minimum of 1,000 Riel per month.  
6. Each member should save a maximum of 100,000 Riel per month.  
7. Each member should only save up to 10,000,000 Riel per year and stop after that.  
8. Each member’s saving should not exceed 30% of total saving.  
9. The group charges each member who takes loan 3% interest rate per month.  
10. Non-members can take a loan from the group only when there is money left after all members have 
taken loan. When non-members take loan, they have to sign a different contract from the one for 
group members.  
11. The money that the members borrow should be used for agriculture, trade and other income-
generation activities that do not violate any government rules.  
12. The members have to organize a meeting once a month during which they focus on saving and other 
businesses.  
13. Each member has to join the monthly meeting, at least 10 times a year.  
14. Members that do not attend three monthly meetings in a year has to pay a penalty; for committee 
member, 5,000 Riel, and for ordinary members, 2,000 Riel.  
15. The group has to form a committee to lead the members. 
16. The committee has to have 4 members.  
17. When one member cannot pay back the loan to the group, or not the full amount, the committee is 
responsible and the guarantee will be used to pay off the loan. The group has to act on the person 
who cannot pay back in the given time. It has to be solved according to the borrowing agreement.  
18. When the money of the group is lost, the committee has to be responsible. The committee is the one 
that keeps the money. 
19. The committee has to be elected by the members. Those who receive the highest number of votes 
become the members of the committee. Committee members must meet the following criteria: 
a. good morality   
b. permanent residence  
c. knowledgeable  
d. honest 
e. hard working 
20. The committee has a five-year mandate. 
21. The committee has the authority to manage the members all the time.  
22. The committee has a role and duty to work for the members.  
23. The committee has to support money for its work.  
24. The committee has the right to take 10% from the interest paid by loan takers to support the group 
work. 
25. In case the committee makes a mistake against the rules of the group, the members can take money 
back.  
26. The money that the members save and other group income can be used for agriculture, other 
multiple benefits, and businesses. 
27. When a member wants to quit the group, she has to follow the proper rule to quit her membership.  
28. In case a member does not follow the rules of the group, the committee can dismiss the member 
from participating. 
29. Any one interested to join the group has to complete a membership application form.  
 
